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THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF CAMPUS BANS ON
"RACIST SPEECH:" THE VIEW FROM WITHOUT AND
WITHIN
Robert A. Sedler*
I.

INTRODUCTION

"Racist speech" is a generic term, which refers primarily to speech
that denigrates persons on the basis of their race or ethnic origin, but
also includes speech that denigrates on the basis of gender or sexual
orientation. Many universities have enacted regulations restricting racist speech in response to a disturbing number of overtly racist incidents on university campuses, as well as hostile incidents directed
against women and against gay and lesbian persons. The justification
for restricting racist speech on campus is that racist speech by its very
nature causes discrete and serious harm to racial minorities, women,
gay and lesbian persons, and other victim groups, and so creates an
"intimidating hostile, or demeaning environment" 1 that "interfere[s]
with an individual's academic efforts,

. .

. [and] participation in Uni-

versity sponsored extra-curricular activities." 2 Proponents of these bans
drgue that the universities must restrict racist speech in order to provide equality of educational opportunity for racial minorities and other
victim groups. 3
The prevalence of university racist speech policies and other proposals to sanction racist speech has prompted an iormous amount of
academic literature on the subject. It is fair to say that most of the
academic commentators advocate some form of restriction on racist
speech on the university campus, emphasizing the harm that it causes
to racial minorities and other victim groups and what commentators
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B., 1956, J.D., 1959, University of Pittsburgh. Valuable research assistance in the preparation of this article was provided by Ms. Barbara
Chupa, a member of the Michigan Bar, when she was a third-year law student at Wayne State
University Law School.

1. The above language is taken from the University of Michigan's Policy on Discrimination
and Discriminatory Harassment by Students in the University Environment, which was invalidated in Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).

2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence, III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 446-48, 462-66.
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contend is the resulting denial of equal educational opportunity. While
all of the advocates of campus restrictions on racist speech recognize
that such restrictions interfere with freedom of expression, they insist
that the value of free expression must be balanced against the harm
caused by racist speech and against the equality value of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Much of the discussion about the First Amendment in this context, like much of the academic commentary about the First Amendment generally, tends to be somewhat theoretical and philosophical.

Academic commentators frequently attempt to demonstrate that restrictions on racist speech are not inconsistent with and may actually
advance First Amendment values, and therefore, such restrictions

should be constitutionally permissible.' The contrary view-a distinctly
minority one-is that campus bans on racist speech will inhibit the discussion of controversial ideas and therefore, are inconsistent with the

unfettered freedom of inquiry to which a university should be
committed.
In this article my approach to the question of the constitutionality

of campus bans on racist speech is quite different and very narrowly
focused. The perspective that I hope to contribute to the debate over

campus bans on racist speech is that of the litigatinglawyer, operating
within the framework of what I call the "law of the First Amendment."'7 The law of the First Amendment is that body of concepts,
principles, and specific doctrines that has emerged over the years from

the Supreme Court's First Amendment decisions. In First Amendment
4. See, e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, Regulating Hate Speech at Public Universities: Are First
Amendment Values Functionally Incompatible with Equal Protection Principles, 39 BUFF. L
REv. 1 (1991); Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: ConstitutionalNarratives in Collision, 85 Nw.U. L. REv.343 (1991); Charles H. Jones, Equality, Dignity, and Harm: The Constitutionality of Regulating .1merican Campus E:hnoviolence, 37 WAYNE L REv. 1383 (1991);
Lawrence, supra note 3; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim's Story, 87 MIcH. L. REV.2320 (1989); Rodney A. Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment
Assumptions About Racist and Sexist Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 171 (1990).
5. It is contended, for example, that "racist speech" distorts the debate in the "marketplace
of ideas," particularly by devaluing the speech of victim groups. Lawrence, supra note 3, at 46870. It may also be noted that the kind of restrictions they propose are usually stated in terms of
general propositions rather than in terms of specific regulations.
6. The constitutional and policy arguments against campus bans on "racist speech" are cogently set forth in Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal,
1990 DUKE L.J. 484.
7. Robert A. Sedler, The First Amendment in Litigation: The "Law of the First Amendment," 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv.457 (1990) [hereinafter Law of the First Amendment].
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cases, it is the law of the First Amendment which controls the result, or
at least sets the parameters for the resolution of the question at issue.
In this article I will demonstrate that under the law of the First
Amendment, virtually any campus ban on racist speech imposed by a
public university will be found to be unconstitutional. 8 My purpose in
adding the litigation perspective to the academic debate over campus
bans on racist speech is in no sense an attempt to trump the debate or
make it irrelevant. Quite to the contrary, academic debate over what
the First Amendment should mean, and over whether racist speech on
campus should be protected under the First Amendment is quite valuable. The exploration of these questions goes to the heart of academic
inquiry and is an important function of commentary. It may be that at
some time in the future, the views of academic commentators on this
very controversial question may reach the Justices on the Supreme
Court and will be embodied in the law of the First Amendment, although I think that this is highly unlikely.9
My purpose in analyzing campus bans on racist speech under the
law of the First Amendment is to make it clear that regardless of
whether or not such bans should be constitutionally permissible, the
stark reality is that they are not.' 0 When they are challenged in court,
the court will declare them unconstitutional, just as the court did in
Doe v. University of Michigan," and The UMW Post v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System,' 2 the only two campus
racist speech cases to come before the courts thus far. It is my hope to
persuade public universities to abandon this unconstitutional enterprise,
and turn their attention to more productive and effective ways of providing equality of educational opportunity for their students.
As the title indicates, this discussion will proceed from "without
8. The scope of constitutionally permissible regulation of "racist speech" on the campus of a
public university is so limited that any ban that would be able to withstand constitutional challenge would have no more than symbolic significance, and would not stop "racist speech" at all.
9. Although it may be "heresay" to say so, I do not think that the Supreme Court pays very
much attention to "grand theories" posited by academic commentators or to their proposals for

"sweeping changes" in constitutional interpretation. In fact, I do not think that it pays much

attention to their views at all. See Robert A. Sedler, Book Review, 8 CONST. COMMENTARY 265,
268-69 (1991).
10. We are speaking, of course, only of bans imposed by public universities, where the Constitution comes into play. As to proposals to extend constitutional requirements to private universities, see Henry J. Hyde & George M. Fishman, The Collegiate Speech ProtectionAct of 1991: A
Response to the New Intolerance in the Academy, 37 WAYNE L. REV. 1469 (1991).
11. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
12. 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
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and within"-from the dual perspectives of an academic commentator
and of a lawyer who was lead counsel for the ACLU in the challenge
to the University of Michigan's racist speech policy. I have approached
legal questions in this manner previously,13 and believe that such an
approach has much to commend it. To the extent that the impartial
and dispassionate perspective of a pure legal scholar is a virtue, this
perspective is admittedly lacking. 14 However, participation as an advocate yields insights that detached scholarly observation can not provide.
My involvement in Doe v. University of Michigan has provided special
insights for me, and they form a very important part of this article.1 5
Part II presents the controversy over racist speech on campus. This
involves an understanding and acknowledgement of the harm to individuals and to the educational environment that commentators have
identified as being caused by racist speech and the other reasons why
universities may be imposing campus bans on it today. I will also discuss the University of Michigan's policy and how that policy operated
in practice.' 6 Part III details the law of the First Amendment as it
applies to restrictions on racist speech. In Part IV, from a constitutional standpoint the most important part of the article, I will discuss
the constitutionality of campus bans on racist speech under the law of
the First Amendment. Here I will present the components of the law of
the First Amendment that are applicable to determine the constitutionality of campus bans on racist speech and that were dispositive in the
Doe and UWM Post cases. I will also explain why virtually any campus
ban on racist speech imposed by a public university will be found unconstitutional. In Part V, I will discuss the actions that public universi13. See, e.g., Robert A. Sedler, The Summary Contempt Power and the Constitution: The
View from Without and Within, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 34 (1976); Robert A. Sedler, Metropolitan
Desegregation in the Wake of Milliken: On Losing Big Battles and Winning Small Wars: The
View Largely from Within, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 535; Robert A. Sedler, The ProceduralDefense
in Selective Service Prosecutions: The View from Without and Within, 56 IowA L. REv. 1121
(1971).

14.

On the other hand, it would not appear that this kind of perspective is found in most of

the academic writings on "racist speech." Most of the authors are quite "passionate" in their
advocacy of restrictions on "racist speech."
15. There was also extensive discovery in Doe, which produced the "legislative history"
leading up to the adoption of the policy and all of the cases in which complaints of a violation of
the policy were filed. The complaints of violation and their disposition by the university officials
administering the policy can serve as an "empirical study" of how a "racist speech" policy has

operated in practice. I will discuss the results of this "empirical study" to some extent in this
writing to demonstrate the impact that a ban on "racist speech" can have on the free expression of
ideas on a university campus.
16. See infra notes 64-97 and accompanynig text.

19921

"RACIST SPEECH" BANS

ties can and should take to protect the rights of racial minorities and
other victim groups, to ensure that all students enjoy equality of educational opportunity on the university campus.
II.

THE CONTROVERSY OVER RACIST SPEECH ON CAMPUS

The primary effort to restrict racist speech in American society is
taking place on university campuses today. Campus bans have been enacted in response to a disturbing number of overtly racist incidents on
university campuses, as well as hostile incidents directed against
women and against gay and lesbian persons. Most of the recent overtly
racist incidents have been directed against black-American students at
traditionally all-white universities, to which blacks are now being admitted in more than token numbers.17 Notions of racial supremacy,
which unfortunately still lurk just below the surface in the thinking of
many Americans, become legitimatized in the minds of some white students when black students are admitted under "affirmative action" programs with lower "paper credentials" than white students who are denied admission. 8 A white student thus can legitimatize an underlying
racist belief in terms of purported opposition to affirmative action.
White students with racist beliefs apparently feel less restrained today
in openly expressing them through degrading "racial epithets." Because
of an increase in reported incidents, universities often feel a strong need
to provide a degree of protection for their minority students.
There is also increased sensitivity on university campuses, as elsewhere, to claims of verbal and physical sexual harassment against
women, which sometimes involve "date rape." The concept of sexual
harassment has been expanded, perhaps in light of the concerns raised
17. For some examples of these incidents, see Lawrence, supra note 3, at 431-34.
18. One of the most enduring consequences of the long and tragic history of racial discrimination in this Nation is an enormous educational gap between blacks as a group and whites as a
group. See Robert A. Sedler, The Constitution, Racial Preference, and the Equal Participation
Objective, in SLAVERY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: THE CONSTITUTION, EQUALITY AND RACE 123,
125 n.18 (Robert Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds., 1988) [hereinafter Sedler, The Constitution].
Because of this enormous "educational gap," the determination of admission to a university primarily on the basis of "comparative objective academic indicators,"such as grades and test scores,
ordinarily will result in the admission of few, if any, blacks. See Robert A. Sedler, Racial Preference, Reality and the Constitution:Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, 17 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 329, 349-55 (1977). It is only by affirmatively taking race into account in the
admission process and admitting black students with significantly lower "comparative objective
academic indicators" than white students that the traditionally all-white universities can hope to
enroll more than token numbers of black students. The same educational gap exists for hispanic
students, and the same need for "affirmative action" applies to them.
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by aggressive sexual behavior by men, to include not only the traditional forms of sexual harassment-unwanted sexual touching, persistent demands for a sexual relationship, "obscene phone calls"-but also
to the expressed view of women as sexual objects, and the dissemination of pornography and other materials depicting the sexual subordination of women. This expanded notion of sexual harassment has led to
a willingness on the part of universities to protect female students from
being subjected to "sexual speech" in a variety of circumstances.
Homosexuals are a third group targeted by those who engage in
racist speech. The societal hostility toward persons of same-sex orientation, particularly male homosexuals, which the Supreme Court itself
has recognized and to an extent legitimized, 19 is readily expressed by
some male college students as they try to establish their own male identity. As a result, incidents of "gay-bashing" which occur on college
campuses, as well as in the larger society, sometimes involve physical
violence. Most academics and university administrators, however, unlike the larger society, are sensitive to the needs of individuals living
non-traditional lifestyles, and want to protect gay and lesbian students
from hostility directed against them by other students because of their
different sexual orientation.
The primary and most frequently articulated justification for restricting racist speech on campus is that it causes discrete and serious
harm to racial minorities and other victim groups, and as a result denies them equality of educational opportunity.20 As Professor Matsuda
has put it: "The negative effects of hate messages are real and immediate for the victims. Victims of vicious hate propaganda have experienced physiological symptoms and emotional distress ranging from
fear in the gut, rapid pulse rate and difficulty in breathing, nightmares,
post-traumatic stress disorder, hypertension, psychosis, and suicide."'"
Racist speech is also said to promote the "ideology of racial
supremacy"22 and is a "mechanism [] for keeping selected victim groups
in subordinated positions."' 23 When the racist speech takes the form of
an insult directed against a particular person, it can "inflict injury by
19. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
20. For a summary of the different categories of harm caused by "racist speech," see Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 267,

271-77 (1991).
21.
22.
23.

Matsuda, supra note 4, at 2336.
Id. at 2332.
Id.
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[its] very utterance ' 24 and can cause that person to doubt her or his
self-worth as a human being."
Some academics further contend that on the university campus,
racist speech causes harm both to the interchange of ideas and to the
educational environment by: injecting "irrationality" into the interchange; silencing minority students and other victim groups due to
the visceral shock and preemptive effect of racist words on further
speech; and devaluing the speech of minorities and other victim
groups.2 6 Finally, it is said that racist speech can interfere with a university's educational mission, insofar as that mission includes promoting diversity and teaching respect for human dignity and individual
self-worth.
It cannot be denied that racist speech may cause discrete and serious harm to racial minorities, other victim groups and to the educational environment. It may be assumed that campus bans on racist
speech are motivated by a genuine concern for the personal and educational welfare of racial minorities, women, gay and lesbian persons, and
other victim groups, and for the educational environment on the university campus. However, these reasons for restricting racist speech interact with another phenomenon that goes beyond the personal and educational welfare of the students who suffer harm from the effects of racist
speech.
This phenomenon is the growing emergence of a new secular orthodoxy on the campuses of many American universities today. The
existence of this secular orthodoxy is at the heart of the debate over
"politically correct thinking," or "P.C." Many faculty members and
administrators today are products of the sixties, and are trying to implement on the campus the values that came to the fore in the sixties:
values of racial equality, gender equality, and respect for individual differences and alternative life styles. Other aspects of this secular orthodoxy are that homosexuality is a morally acceptable and legitimate
lifestyle, that the tenets of feminism are superior to the traditional view
of women, and that male-oriented sexuality is a form of discrimination
against women.
While the proponents of these values in the university community
24. Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets and
Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 173-74.

25. Id. at 136-37.
26.
27.

See Post, supra note 20, at 275.
Id. at 275-77.
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deny that they are trying to impose politically correct thinking on students and colleagues, there is clearly the danger that the efforts to implement these values in the academic setting will give rise to a new

officially-imposed secular orthodoxy, in which ideas that are seemingly
inconsistent with these values are deemed to be illegitimate. One such
illegitimate idea, for example, is that there are biological differences
among racial groups which contribute to cognitive and other differences

among the races. A related idea is that biological differences between
men and women cause men and women to behave differently in some
respects, so that men are biologically more suited to perform certain

kinds of tasks while women are biologically more suited to perform
other kinds of tasks.
Universities' efforts to restrict racist speech, while legitimately mo-

tivated by a genuine concern for the personal and educational welfare
of minority students and other victim groups, may also reflect the new
secular orthodoxy that is emerging in much of the university world today. Just as the universities in the 1950's and the 1960's all too often
tried to establish a political orthodoxy by restricting the expression of

controversial political ideas and prohibiting "anti-establishment" political activity, today we see the universities trying to implement a new

secular orthodoxy, one component of which is the imposition of restrictions on racist speech.2"
28. In the late 1960's and early 1970's, while on the law faculty of the University of Kentucky, I was much involved with the "New Left," as I defended young men in draft resistance
cases and students and others engaged in anti-war protest activity. In reviewing THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970), I drew on that involvement to suggest that
the "New Left," like the "Establishment" then in power, would not hesitate to suppress ideas with
which it disagreed:
While the present social-economic-political system has brought to power persons whose
values are likely to be wealth-oriented and essentially conservative, I do not think that the
attitude toward dissent and social change would necessarily be different if a "peaceful
revolution" were to take place and the reins of power were transferred to those whose
In short, if the dissent and social change objective is
values are socialistic and radical ....
to be protected, it is necessary to take account of the attitudes toward dissent and social
change on the part of those administering the legal system, and those attitudes cannot be
expected to be favorable no matter what the social-economic-political complexion of the
society may be. While my "input" in this regard comes from observing the system as administered by the "Establishment right," I am willing to assume-and believe I must if my
goal is to maximize the freedom to dissent and work for social change-that the same
problem will exist if the system is administered by an "Establishment left."
Robert A. Sedler, The First Amendment in Theory and Practice, 80 YALE L.J. 1070, 1082 (1971)
(reviewing THOMAS I. EMERSON. THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION (1970)).
And in regard to the "younger" "New Left" people, who are well-represented among university faculty members and administrators today, I made the following observation:
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This is exactly what happened with respect to the operation of the
University of Michigan's racist speech policy invalidated in Doe v. University of Michigan.2" I will concentrate on demonstrating three salient
points that have emerged from the "empirical study" of the operation
of one university's racist speech policy.
The first and most significant point is that the University's policy
was directed against the expression of racist ideas and was intended by
those who administered it to implement a new secular orthodoxy on the
university campus. That this was the thrust of the policy and the intention of those administering it is demonstrated both by the "interpretive
guide"3 0 that was issued by the University and by the way that the
policy was administered in practice.
The guide "purported to be an authoritative interpretation of the
Policy and provided [fourteen] examples of sanctionable conduct." 31
The plaintiff contended that, "[e]very single example prohibit[ed] acts
of expression or association that are absolutely or in all but very limited
circumstances protected by the First Amendment." 32 The following example, which was the basis for the plaintiff's standing in Doe,3 3 and
which was a major point of reference for the overbreadth challenge,
clearly illustrates how the policy was directed against the expression of
racist ideas and was intended to impose a secular orthodoxy on the
My own discussions with younger "New Left" people-and I should add that politically I consider myself a part of the "New Left"-about freedom of expression have
caused me some dismay, particularly when they make arguments such as "certain kinds of
expression (support of the Vietnam War) are so immoral that they cannot be tolerated,"
and "repression by definition exists only in a capitalistic system," so that the imprisoning of
"counterrevolutionary" writers in the Soviet Union does not constitute repression.
Id. at 1082 n.54. The new officially-imposed secular orthodoxy on some university campuses today
indicates just how prophetic these observations have turned out to be.
29. In the planning stage of the present article, I had intended to discuss in detail the substance of the University's racist speech policy and how it operated in practice. In the interim,
however, there have been a number of other discussions of this matter, see, e.g., Joseph D. Grano,
Free Speech v. the University of Michigan, ACADEMIC QUESTIONS, Spring 1990, at 7; Peter
Linzer, White Liberal Looks at Racist Speech, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 187, 194-196, 211-14
(1991), including my own, Robert A. Sedler, Doe v. University of Michigan and Campus Bans on
"Racist Speech": The View from Within, 37 WAYNE L. REv. 1325, 1331-36 (1991), so I will not
belabor the present writing with another detailed discussion.
30. The "interpretive guide," was issued after concerns were expressed by the Board of
Regents about the vagueness of the terms of the policy. A copy of the policy and the guide were
sent by mail to all registered students in the University for the 1988-89 academic year.
31. 721 F. Supp. at 857-58.
32. Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 16 (Doe v. University
of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (No. 89-CV-71683-DT)).
33. See infra note 99.
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campus: "[a] male student makes remarks in class like 'Women just
aren't as good in this field as men,' thus creating a hostile learning
atmosphere for female classmates." 4 This example would serve to implement that aspect of the secular orthodoxy which maintains that the

tenets of feminism are superior to the traditional view of women, specifically that aspect which maintains that there are no biological differences between the sexes which would make members of each sex biologically more suited than the other to engage in particular kinds of

activity. Under the policy, as this example indicates, whenever a male
student expressed an idea that was contrary to these aspects of the sec-

ular orthodoxy, he would be deemed to have created "a hostile learning
atmosphere for female classmates."35
Even more telling in regard to the advancement of the secular or34. Affirmative Action Office, University of Mich., What Students Should Know About
Discriminatory Harassment [hereinafter Guide] (booklet distributed to students concurrently with
the University's promulgation of Policy).
35. Id. That ensuring conformity to the secular orthodoxy was at least one purpose of the
Policy is further illustrated by the comments in the guide on classroom discussion. "What about
classroom discussion? The University encourages open and vigorous intellectual discussion in the
classroom. To reach this goal students must be free to participate in class discussion without
feeling harassed or intimidated by others' comments." Id.
To say the least, these comments turn freedom of academic inquiry on its head. Freedom of
speech and inquiry is restricted if the expression of certain ideas would be perceived as "harassing
or injuring others." And students must refrain from making comments that could cause other
students to feel "harassed or intimidated." Students must thus "learn the secular orthodoxy" so
that they will not be accused of making "harassing or intimidating" comments.
Another example, directed against the expression of offensive ideas, was: "[y]ou comment in
a derogatory way about a particular person or group's physical appearance or sexual orientation,
or their cultural origins, or religious beliefs." Id. The number of viewpoints that would be prescribed under this example is simply staggering. As the plaintiff stated in his affidavit:
Rather than encourage her maturing students to question each other's beliefs on such diverse and controversial issues such as the proper role of women in society, the merits of
particular religions, or the moral propriety of homosexuality, the University has decided
that it must protect its students from what it considers to be "unenlightened" ideas.
Affidavit of John Doe in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 8-9, Doe
(No. 89-CV-71683-DT).
Still another example was: "[Y]ou display a confederate flag on the door of your room in the
residence hall," id. notwithstanding that the expression of ideas by means of a display of a flag
has been considered protected by the First Amendment ever since Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359 (1931). Four other examples involved offensive jokes: "[You] tell jokes about gay men
and lesbians;" "[y]ou laugh at and joke about someone in your class who stutters;" "[y]our student organization sponsors entertainment that includes a comedian who slurs Hispanics;" "[m]ale
students leave pornographic pictures and jokes on the desk of a female graduate student." Affidavit of John Doe in support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 8-9, Doe (No. 89CV-71683-DT). Offensive jokes and parody are fully protected by the First Amendment, regardless of their outrageousness or the real injury they may cause to a person's feelings. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).

19921

"RACIST SPEECH" BANS

thodoxy and the impact of the policy on the expression of ideas was the

matter of how the policy was administered in practice. Through discovery, we obtained all of the cases in which complaints of a violation of
the policy were filed. 36 The district court relied on three of the cases

involving expression in the classroom in support of its conclusion that,
"as applied by the University over the past year, the Policy was consistently applied to reach protected speech."' 37 I will use two of these cases

to illustrate how the policy was applied to implement the prevailing
secular orthodoxy with respect to homosexuality.
In one of the cases, a graduate student in Social Work (who we
later discovered was black) was charged with harassment on the basis
of sexual orientation in that he had "repeatedly said that homosexuality is an illness that needs to be cured,"'3 8 and that he had "developed a
model to change gay men and lesbians to a heterosexual orientation. ' ' 9

He also had discussed efforts to apply this model in his field placement.
The student contested the charge, and the case went to a formal hear-

ing.40 A divided hearing panel held that the student's discussion of "ho-

36. As we had requested, all the names of the complaining and offending students were
deleted from the files. After sifting through the cases, and discarding the large number of obscene
phone call complaints and most of the cases where no action was taken, we settled on 20 representative cases, and submitted them with a summary of each case and the complete file as an exhibit.
See Plaintiff's Exhibit submitted in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Doe (No. 89CV-71683-DT) [hereinafter Exhibit].
In UWM Post v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis.
1991) where the court invalidated the University of Wisconsin's "racist speech" ban, the court
discussed nine cases where students at various campuses in the University of Wisconsin System
had been sanctioned under the ban. Except for the fact that these cases did not involve classroom
discussion (classroom discussion was specifically exempted from the ban), the cases bear a striking
similarity to the University of Michigan cases, and we will refer to some of them in the discussion
following.
37. 721 F. Supp. at 865. This was in response to the university's argument that "the Policy
did not apply to speech that is protected by the First Amendment," and its urging the court "to
disregard the Guide as 'inaccurate' and look instead to 'the manner in which the Policy has been
interpreted and applied by those charged with its enforcement.'" Id. at 864-65. As the district
court went on to say:
The manner in which these three complaints were handled demonstrated that the University considered serious comments made in the context of classroom discussion to be santionable under the Policy ....
There is no evidence in the record that the Administrator ever
declined to pursue a complaint through attempted mediation because the alleged harassing
conduct was protected by the First Amendment. . . . The University could not seriously
argue that the policy was never interpreted to reach protected conduct. It is clear that the
policy was overbroad both on its face and as applied.
Id. at 866.
38. Exhibit, supra note 36, at 5-6.
39. Id. at 6.
40. This was the only case that went to a formal hearing. The hearing panel'was to consist
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mosexuality as an illness" did not violate the policy. However, the
panel stated gratuitously that the finding should not be constructed as
"condoning the actions or statements of [the student],"4" and that what

he was accused of doing "should' be reviewed by the appropriate social
work professionals in considering [the student's] suitability as a professional social worker." 4
In a second case, in a business school class a student read a limerick which poked fun at alleged homosexual acts of a well-known athlete. After class, another student, apparently gay, read him the policy

and accused him of having engaged in intimidating behavior.4 3 Although the offending student immediately apologized, the offended student filed a complaint. The offending student agreed to an informal

resolution, under which he published a letter of apology in the campus
newspaper and agreed to attend a "Gay Rap" session." As these two

cases demonstrate, the policy was perceived by the officials administering it and the students filing complaints under it as embodying the prevailing secular orthodoxy, here that aspect pertaining to

homosexuality.45
Another series of cases involved enforcement of the prevailing secular orthodoxy with respect to sexual harassment and attitudes about
sexuality. In one of them a male student had put up a poster "'depict-

ing a monster attacking a woman sexually,' and a caption reading,
'[d]ate rape is not rape.'

",4

The charge was that the poster constituted

of four students and a tenured faculty member.
41. Id.
42. Id. The case is discussed at 721 F. Supp. at 865. The student was also found guilty of
sexual harassment against particular women, a charge that was clearly supported by the evidence.
43. Id. at 7.
44. Exhibit, supra note 36, at 7. The case is discussed at 721 F. Supp. at 865.
The third case involved statements made by a white dental student at the orientation session
of a preclinical dentistry class. The was widely regarded as one of the most difficult for second
year dentistry students. In the orientation session, where the class was broken up into small
groups, the student stated that "he had heard that minorities have a difficult time in the course
and that he had heard that they were not treated fairly." Exhibit, supra note 36, at 5. The faculty
member teaching the course, herself a minority person, filed a complaint on the ground that the
comment was unfair and hurt her chances for tenure. The student was then counseled about the
existence of the policy, and he agreed to write a letter apologizing for making the statement
without adequately verifying the allegation, which he said he had heard from his roommate, a
black former dentistry student. 721 F. Supp. at 865.
45. In another case where a complaint was filed, but no action was indicated in the file,
presumably because the identity of the offending student or students was not known, the charge
was that students had put up a poster announcing an "End of Art Fair" party, which used the
word "fag" several times. Exhibit, supra note 36, at 2.
46. Id. at 4.
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sexual harassment against "female residents of 76 corridor square. 47
The student entered into a "behavior contract" with *theresident advisor and the building director, under which he agreed among other
things to "refrain from placing any offensive or harassing materials on
his door,48 . . . [to] attend a Sexual Assault Prevention program at a
specified time [and to] write no less than a two page analysis of the
presentation .... ,,4 In another, a student had posted signs in a residence hall advertising for a roommate. The sign "was headed 'SEX.'
and referred to an 'active Co-Ed hall with many lean and hungry
women.' "50 The charge was that "the sign constituted sexual harassment against 'any female resident, staff member, or visitor.' ,,51 The
student was given a verbal reprimand by a member of the Housing
Staff. 2 Again, these examples indicate that the policy was perceived by
the officials administering it and the students filing complaints under it
as embodying that aspect of the secular orthodoxy dealing with sexual
harassment and sexuality.
The second point that has emerged from the "empirical study" reflected in the Doe litigation is that the university officials were using a
form of "mind control" to enforce the policy: they required offending
students to write humiliating letters of apology, to undergo "re-education" and "sensitivity training," and to enter into "behavior contracts."5 3 In the case of the business student whose limerick offended a
gay classmate, the University required the student to publish a letter of
apology in the campus newspaper and to attend a Gay Rap session.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Exhibit, supra note 36, at 4. Another student sent a female student a computer message
in which he described an apparently fictionalized case of date rape. The complaint only requested
that the Administrator send the student the letter. The Administrator informed the student that
his action was in violation of the policy and that "his message 'reflects an insensitive and dangerous attitude toward date rape, which is a serious and significant problem on this campus and in

our society.'" Id. at 7.
50. Id. at 3-4.
51. Id. at 4.
52. Id. at 4. Other cases of this nature where complaints were filed, but where no action was
indicated in the file, presumably because the identity of the offending student or students was not
known, included the following: (1) "[a] student distributed a flyer headed, '25 Good Reasons Why

Beer is Better Than Women,'" which contained mostly sexual references, id. at 6; (2) a note was
placed on the door of a female student's room saying "Q. How many men does it take to mop a
floor? A. None, it's a woman's job," id. at 8; (3) "[a] student posted a "Myth of the Month"
poster on a residence hall bulletin board [and] [t]he 'fact' in [it] was that, 'In certain situations,
women ask for rape,'" id. at 8; (4) "[m]agazine pictures of nude women were posted over the
stalls in the men's bathroom, id.
53. See generally id. at 1-9.
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The University required the student who put up the "Date rape is not

rape" poster to enter into a behavior contract and attend a Sexual Assault Prevention program.54
A third case involved a black law student, who during the course
of an argument with a white law student in the Law Building, "used
the term 'white trash' and said, '[i]t would be in your best interest not
to be indignant to me or four o'clock will be more than quitting
time.' -5 The black student complied with the white student's demand

for a letter of apology. The letter of apology was very humiliating and
could not help but adversely affect the black student's self-esteem-the
very thing that a racist speech policy is supposedly designed to pre-

vent.

6

In another case, where a guest in a student's dormitory room

was overheard making the remark, "Its just a nigger fighting," the conduct of the guest was "imputed" to the student, and the accused student agreed to attend a seminar or workshop on "diversity."'57 As stated

in the plaintiff's brief in Doe, this kind of activity on the part of the
university officials administering the policy was "something that might
more appropriately be found at the University of Beijing than on the
campus of one of America's great universities." 58
The third point that emerges from experience with the operation
54. Two similar cases occurred under the operation of the University of Wisconsin's ban. In
one a student at the University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire was engaged in an argument with a
female student about statements she made in the University newspaper, and during the course of
the ten minute argument, he called her a "fucking bitch" and a "fucking cunt." UMW Post v.
Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1167 (E.D. Wis. 1991). The
offending student was placed on probation for a semester and was required to perform 20 hours of
community service at a shelter for abused women. Id. In the other, a student at the University of
Wisconsin-River Falls yelled at a female student in public, "you've got nice tits." Id. at 1168. The
offending student was placed on probation for the remainder of his enrollment at the university
and was required to apologize to the female student, to refrain from further contact with her and
to obtain psychological counselling. Id.
55. Exhibit, supra note 36, at 1.
56. Id.
The "mirror image" of this case was presented in a case arising under the University of
Wisconsin ban, where during an argument with a black female student, a white female student
referred to her as a "fat-ass nigger." UMW Post, 774 F. Supp. at 1168. The offending student,
who was already on probation, was required to write a letter of apology, to view a video on racism
and write an essay on the video, and was also reassigned to another residence hall. Id.
In another case, a student who had called another student "Shakazulu," in addition to being
placed on probation and being required to consult with an alcohol abuse counselor, was required
to "plan a project in conjunction with the Center for Education and Cultural Advancement 'to
help sensitize [himself] to the issues of diversity." Id. at 1167.
57. Exhibit, supra note 36, at 8.
58. Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 4-5 n.3, Doe
(No. 89-CV-71683-DT).
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of the University of Michigan's racist speech policy is that contrary to
popular belief, racist speech is not a matter*of straight white males
versus minorities, women, gays and other victim groups: . complaints
were filed against black students for racist and homophobic speech. A
complaint was filed against a white student for asserting that a minority faculty member had discriminated against blacks.5 9 A number of
the complaints were filed by women students on the ground that male
students, sometimes unidentified, had put up posters or pictures of a
sexual nature. Other complaints were on the basis of overheard remarks that were not addressed to the complainant. In short, it was everybody complaining about everybody else about everything.
As the above discussion makes clear, the policy was intended to
advance a new secular orthodoxy and was administered in such a way
as to reach any form of expression that was deemed to be offensive or
to run counter to the prevailing secular orthodoxy. Proponents of campus bans on racist speech insist that there is no inconsistency between
such bans and the function of a university as a place for free and unfettered inquiry and expression. The empirical study of how one major
university's campus ban on racist speech was administered and operated in practice raises some concern about this contention.
Academic commentators tend to dismiss Doe v. University of
Michigan as a case involving no more than one university's poorly
drafted racist speech policy.6" In arguing for more carefully drafted
campus speech bans, they imply that such bans would not have the
same kind of impact on the free expression of ideas as did the University of Michigan's policy. Although I think that the way that the University of Michigan administered its policy is symptomatic of the way
that most universities would administer such a policy,61 this is largely
beside the point. It is my submission that campus bans on racist
speech, no matter how narrowly-framed and no matter how justified,
59. See supra note 44.
60. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 3, at 477-78 n.161; Smolla, supra note 4, at 208 ("the

University failed to confine sufficiently its definition of covered speech").
61.

This is demonstrated by the way in which the University of Wisconsin ban, which was

more narrowly crafted than the University of Michigan ban, had been administered in practice.
We have previously given some examples of that administration. A particularly egregious interference with the expression of ideas under the Wisconsin ban was the disciplining of a student for

angrily saying to an Asian-American student: "Its people like you-that's the reason this country
is screwed up," and that, "[w]hites are always getting screwed by minorities and some day the
Whites will take over." UMW Post v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp.
1163, 1167 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
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are directedprimarily against the expression of racist ideas. Since, as
I will demonstrate in the next section of the article, a public university
cannot for any reason prohibit the expression of racist ideas on campus, virtually any campus ban on racist speech will be found to violate
the First Amendment.

III.

THE LAW OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CAMPUS BANS ON
RACIST SPEECH

The Law of the First Amendment
As stated at the outset, this article discusses the constitutionality
of bans on racist speech on campus from the perspective of the litigating lawyer and with reference to what I have called the law of the First
Amendment. 2 It is this law that is applicable in actual First Amendment litigation. It consists in large part of concepts, principles and specific doctrines that the Court has developed over the years in the process of deciding First Amendment cases. These concepts, principles and
specific doctrines are supplemented by a residually applicable balancing
approach, which to a degree consists of a number of subsidiary doctrines. In the context of actual litigation, First Amendment analysis is
very much a matter of identification and application. In many cases,
once the Court identifies the appropriate concept, principle or specific
doctrine, the parameters for the resolution of the constitutional question at issue have been established and the result is often fairly clear.
The point to be emphasized in this regard is that the result in
litigation is controlled by the Court's application of the law of the First
Amendment and not by a general "balancing" approach or by some
"theory" about the meaning of the First Amendment. It is sometimes
said that when governmental regulation is directed at the non-communicative impact of expression, as opposed to the specific message or
viewpoint expressed, the Court follows an ad hoe balancing approach:
balancing the interest in freedom of expression against other societal
interests as these interests appear in the context of particular limitations on expression. s However, as an explanation of how First Amend62. My thesis with respect to the "law of the First Amendment" is developed fully in Law
of the First Amendment, supra note 7. In the present writing, I will reference that article frequently, but will try to avoid needless repetition.
63. See, e.g., LAURENcE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988). As
Professor Tribe puts it: "the 'balance' between the values of freedom of expression and government's regulatory interest is struck on a case-by-case basis, guided by whatever unifying principles
may be articulated." Id. at 792.
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ment analysis operates in litigation, the balancing approach explanation, even as to regulation directed at the non-communicative impact of
expression, is somewhat misleading.
Often the result in a First Amendment case is controlled by the
application of the appropriate concept, principle or specific doctrine.
When this is so, no balancing takes place at all, and the application of
the concept, principle or specific doctrine either renders the particular
limitation on expression unconstitutional or at least sets the parameters
for the resolution of the constitutional question. 4 Moreover, even when
there is no controlling concept, principle or specific doctrine, the
Court's application of the residual balancing approach is qualified by
the Court's precedents dealing with a particular kind of restriction or
interference with expression. To this extent, the Court is applying "subsidiary doctrine" to determine the constitutionality of the particular restriction or interference in issue rather than engaging in a general balancing approach. 5
The constitutionality of campus bans on racist speech then will be
determined with reference to the law of the First Amendment. The
courts will not engage in some general balancing-balancing the harm
caused to the victims by racist speech against the resulting interference
with freedom of expression, or balancing the "equality value" of the
Fourteenth Amendment against the "freedom of expression value" of
the First Amendment. Rather, they will be applying the law of the
First Amendment.
Any significant campus ban on racist speech will conflict with
three very important First Amendment principles: content neutrality,
the protection of offensive speech, and the heightened protection of expression in the academic context, and will therefore invariably be held
unconstitutional. This was the fate of the very broad University of
Michigan ban in Doe v. University of Michigan, and of the much narrower University of Wisconsin ban in the UWM Post case.
Since I have discussed these principles at length elsewhere, I will
only summarize that discussion here, and I will then discuss the application of these principles in the Doe and UWM cases. Under the princi64. See Law of the First Amendment, supra note 7, at 460-61. In this regard, it may be
noted that the Court's application of a general "balancing" approach over the years has resulted
in some specific doctrines that reflect "balancing" considerations, such as the "clear and present
danger" doctrine, the "commercial speech" doctrine, and the "symbolic speech" doctrine. These
doctrines now control where applicable and make any further balancing in a particular case
unnecessary.
65. See id. at 461, 481-83.
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ple of content neutrality, the government may not proscribe any expression because of its content, and an otherwise valid regulation violates
the First Amendment if it differentiates between expression based on
content.66 Analytically, there are two aspects to the principle of content
neutrality: viewpoint neutrality and categorical neutrality. Under the
viewpoint neutrality aspect of the principle, to which the Court has
never recognized any exceptions, the government cannot regulate expression in such a way as to favor one viewpoint over another. The
requirement of viewpoint neutrality was the basis for the Court's invalidation of state and federal bans on flag desecration.67 The majority
took the position that the asserted governmental interest in preserving
the flag as a "symbol of nationhood and national unity" 68 violated this
requirement, emphasizing that the government had authorized burning
as a proper means of disposing of a torn or soiled flag, so that the
thrust of the ban was directed toward the content of the message conveyed by the burning.69
The requirement of viewpoint neutrality also resulted in the invalidation of a District of Columbia law that prohibited the display of any
sign within 500 feet of a foreign embassy that would "tend[] to bring a
foreign government into public odium or public disrepute .. ."o The
law by its terms only prohibited displays that were critical of the foreign government; displays that were favorable to the foreign government were not prohibited. The law in effect ordained an officially approved viewpoint about the foreign government whose embassy was
being picketed.71 Likewise, the requirement of viewpoint neutrality was
violated by a federal law that allowed the wearing of U.S. military
uniforms in a portrayal only if the portrayal does not "'tend to discredit' the military. ' 72 Still another example of the application of this
aspect of the principle of content neutrality is found in the invalidation
66. Id. at 466.

67.

United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397

(1989).
68. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2407; Johnson, 491 U.S. at 420.
69. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2409; Johnson, 491 U.S. at 410-418. The dissenting Justices, by

contrast, took the position that the defendant's flag burning in these cases did not involve the
expression of ideas, and that it was the "use of this particular symbol and not the idea that he
sought to convey by it" which was being prescribed. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 432. Thus, in their
view, the laws did not implicate the principle of viewpoint neutrality. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 43233, 438-39.
70. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 316 (1988).

71.

Id.

72.

Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 62 (1970).
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of the civil rights anti-pornography law that defined proscribed pornography as the "graphic sexually explicit subordination of women. 73a The
law was invalidated because it favored one view of the role of men and
women in sexual encounters-equality between men and women-over
another-the sexual subordination of women by men.74
Under the second aspect of the principle of content neutrality, categorical neutrality, the government generally cannot regulate in such a
way as to differentiate between categories of expression.7 5 Recently, the
Court strongly affirmed this aspect of the principle when it struck down
New York's "Son of Sam" law, because that law only applied to a
criminal's proceeds from "storytelling" about the crime and not to
other assets.76
As the above demonstrates, the principle of content neutrality is a
very powerful one, and if it applies to a challenge of a particular re73. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 324 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd mem.,
475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
74. Id. As the Seventh Circuit stated:
Under the ordinance graphic sexually explicit speech is "pornography" or not depending on
the perspective the author adopts. Speech that "subordinates" women and also, for example, presents women as enjoying pain, humiliation, or rape, or even simply presents women
in "positions of servility or submission or display" is forbidden, no matter how great the
literary or political value of the work taken as a whole. Speech that portrays women in
positions of equality is lawful, no matter how graphic the sexual content. This is thought
control. It establishes an "approved" view of women, of how they may react to sexual
encounters, of how the sexes may relate to each other. Those who espouse the approved
view may use sexual images; those who do not, may not.
Id. at 328.
75. Under this aspect of the principle, the Court has invalidated a variety of laws distinguishing between categories of expression. See the discussion and review of cases in Law of the
First Amendment, supra note 7, at 468-70.
The requirement of category neutrality is built into the doctrine applicable to governmental
licensing of expression, in that the licensing criteria cannot distinguish between categories of expression. So, a "parade permit" law not only cannot distinguish between viewpoints, but also cannot distinguish between parades based on the subject matter of the parade. If a city allows an
organization to sponsor a Thanksgiving Day parade, for example, it cannot refuse to allow another
organization to have a rally protesting abortion.
The Court has recognized two limited exceptions to the requirement of category neutrality in
governmental regulation, both involving the regulation of particular lower level speech. In order to
deal with the secondary consequences resulting from the concentration of businesses purveying
sexually explicit materials, a city can enact zoning regulations requiring such businesses to spread
out. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). And because commercial
speech receives less constitutional protection than non-commercial speech, a billboard regulation
does not violate the First Amendment when it exempts some billboards from the regulation, although it does violate the First Amendment when it exempts some non-commercial billboards
from the regulation. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
76. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. Crime Control Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
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striction of expression, it controls the outcome of that challenge.7 7 The
First Amendment, as the Court has said, requires "equality of status in
the field of ideas," 78 and the principle of content neutrality is the doctrinal vehicle by which such "equality of status" is achieved.
The second applicable First Amendment principle, protection of
offensive speech, forecloses any justification for a restriction on expression on the ground that the expression is offensive. As the Supreme
Court stated in Johnson v. Texas when striking down the Texas flag
desecration laws: "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression
of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable. '79' Nor may the government prohibit the expression of an idea
in a particular manner that is highly offensive, such as by the use of an
"unseemly expletive." 80 Under this principle the government cannot
prohibit the expression of an idea on the ground that the idea itself or
the manner in which the idea is expressed is highly offensive to many
people. Therefore, any time the government tries to justify a restriction
on expression on the ground of its "offensiveness," the justification is
necessarily improper.
The third principle, heightened protection of expression in the academic context, emerged from the constitutional challenges of governmental efforts in the fifties and sixties to impose a political orthodoxy
on university campuses and in the public schools. As the Court in a
number of cases invalidated loyalty oath requirements for public employees and legislative inquiries into the beliefs and associations of
teachers, it emphasized the importance of free inquiry in the academic
context. For example, as Justice Brennan stated in Keyishian v. Board
of Regents:
77. Recall that the question that divided the Court in the flag desecration cases was the
application of the principle to the challenged restrictions in question. Where the terms of a flag
desecration law expressly violate the principle of content neutrality, such as a law prohibiting
"casting contempt" on the flag, the law clearly is unconstitutional. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S.
566 (1974).
78. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
79. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). In that case, the Court refused to recognize an exception to this principle "even where our flag has been involved." Id. The principle of
protection of offensive speech even applies to commercial speech. Thus the government cannot
prohibit product advertising, such as an advertisement for contraceptives, on the ground that such
advertising would be offensive to many persons. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60

(1983).
80. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23 (1971) (public display of jacket with the message,
"Fuck the Draft").
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Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That
freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom ....
The classroom
is peculiarly the "marketplace of ideas.""" The Nation's future depends upon
leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which
discovers truth "out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of
authoritative selection." 82

It is on the basis of this kind of language in the Court's opinions and its
actions in protecting freedom of academic inquiry against governmental interference that we can find a principle of heightened protection of
expression in the academic context.
This principle was also involved in cases arising in the late sixties
and early seventies when public universities tried to restrict "anti-es83
tablishment" speech and association on campus. In Healy v. James
the Court held that a public university could not refuse to grant official
recognition to a student group, here the local chapter of the Students

for a Democratic Society, because of disagreement with the group's
philosophy or because of an unsubstantiated fear that the group would
be a "disruptive influence." 4 The Court also held that a public university could not constitutionally expel a student for distributing on campus a newspaper which contained a cartoon "depicting policemen raping the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice,"8 5 and an article
81. The concept of the "marketplace of ideas" was long ago expressed by Justice Holmes in
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting):
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that
truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate
is the theory of our Constitution.
82. 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Associated
Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (1943)). Similarly, as Chief Justice Warren stated in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality opinion):
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by those
who guide and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in
our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation ....
Teachers and
students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity
and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.
83. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
84. The Court, citing Keyishian, observed that "[t]he college classroom with its surrounding
environs is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas,' and we break no new constitutional ground in
reaffirming this Nation's dedication to safeguarding academic freedom." Id. at 180-81.
85. Id. at 667-68.
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with the headline, "'M
f
Acquitted,' which discussed the
trial and acquittal of a New York City youth who was a member of an
organization know as 'Up Against the Wall, M_ f_ _' "85
In the context of campus bans on racist speech, these First

Amendment principles interact with each other, and operate in conjunction with the void on its face doctrine. The void on its face doctrine, which is extremely important in actual First Amendment litigation, is one of those doctrines that is derived from the fundamental
First Amendment concept of chilling effect.8 Under this doctrine, a
law regulating or applicable to expression may be challenged on its
face for substantial overbreadth or vagueness. 8 The doctrine is extremely powerful in practice, not only because the challenged law can

be invalidated without regard to whether the activity of the party challenging it is constitutionally protected,89 but also because the constitu-

tional analysis does not go beyond the terms of the law itself. Moreover, once a law is invalidated on its face, it is as if the law literally has
been excised from the statute books: it cannot be enforced against any

person in any circumstances.9 0
In practice, however, the void on its face doctrine, while perhaps
86. Papish v. Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667 (1973). The university's
justification that the expulsion was necessary to uphold its interest in maintaining "conventions of
decency" on campus was summarily rejected, the Court observing that, "the mere dissemination
of ideas-no matter how offensive to good taste-on a state university campus may not be shut off
in the name alone of 'conventions of decency.'" Id. at 670. As this discussion indicates, for this
reason the expulsion also violated the principle of protection of offensive speech. And the university's attempt to justify its action as a reasonable time, place and manner limitation foundered on
the principle of content neutrality, since the undisputed facts showed that the student was "expelled because of the disapproved content of the newspaper rather than the time, place or manner
of its distribution." Id. at 670 (alteration in original).
87. See the discussion of the "chilling effect" concept in Law of the First Amendment,
supra note 7, at 462-64.
88. Analytically, a law is overbroad when it includes within its terms constitutionally protected expression, and is vague when the terms are such that it could reasonably be construed to
include within its prohibitions constitutionally protected expression. A law can be overbroad without being vague, such as a law prohibiting all peaceful picketing. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88 (1940). Usually, however, overbreadth and vagueness merge, and the Court has stated that it
has "traditionally viewed vagueness and overbreadth as logically related and similar doctrines."
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 n.8 (1983). In practice, the challenge ordinarily is that the
law on its face, is substantially vague and overbroad, in violation of the First Amendment.
89. See Robert A. Sedler, The Assertion of Constitutional Jus Tertii: A Substantive Approach, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1308, 1326-27 (1982).
90. As Justice White, who is no great fan of the void on its face doctrine, has stated, it is
"strong medicine" and should be applied "sparingly and only as a last resort." Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).
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applied "sparingly and only as a last resort" 9' to laws that have as their
primary purpose the regulation of conduct and have only an incidental
effect on expression, 92 is readily applied to invalidate laws that by their
terms are directed against expressive activity. Thus, in Houston v.

Hill, 3 the Court invalidated on its face a Houston ordinance making it
unlawful for a person to "in any manner oppose, molest,
abuse or inter94
rupt any policeman in the execution of his duty."
In the context of campus bans on racist speech then, the principles
of content neutrality, protection of offensive speech, and heightened

protection of expression in the academic context interact with each
other, and in conjunction with the void on its face doctrine operate to
impose an insuperable constitutional obstacle to a public university's
efforts to ban racist speech on campus.
IV.

THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
AND UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN BANS

In Doe v. University of Michigan,9 5 there could be no serious ques-

tion that the University of Michigan's racist speech policy was uncon91. Id.
92. An example is a law prohibiting the dissemination of child pornography, to which the,
void on its face doctrine was held inapplicable. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). In
cases where the law contains a severability clause and the severable part of the law could operate
independently, the Court will not invalidate the law in its entirety, but will only strike down the
"facially invalid" part of the law. See, e.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491

(1985).
93. 482 U.S 451 (1987).
94. Id. at 455. The ordinance was overbroad because it prohibited persons from criticizing
and insulting police officers, which is constitutionally protected expression. The overbreadth here
was real and substantial in relation to the law's plainly legitimate sweep. Id. at 460-65. Other
examples of regulations of expression found to be void on its face include regulations prohibiting:
"opprobrious words or abusive language tending to cause a breach of the peace," Gooding v.
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 519 (1972) (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 26-6303), "[people to] assemble...
on any of the sidewalks... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing

by," Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (quoting

CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE OF

§ 901-L6), and "wantonly to curse or revile or to use obscene or opprobrious language toward or with reference to any member of the city police while in the actual performance
of his duty." Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 430 (1974) (quoting NEw ORLEANS, LA., NEW
ORLEANS ORDINANCE 828 M.C.S. § 49-7). In the Lewis case the Louisiana Supreme Court tried
to "rewrite" the statute to limit it to constitutionally unprotected "fighting words," as defined in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), but the effort failed, since the language of
the statute "plainly has a broader sweep than the constitutional definition of 'fighting words,'"
415 U.S. at 132, and so remained "susceptible of application to protected speech." Id. at 134. For
an additional discussion of the void on its face doctrine see Law of the First Amendment, supra
note 7, at 464-66.
95. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
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stitutional under the law of the First Amendment." The policy 9 7 by its
96. Because Doe was an affirmative challenge to the university's ban on "racist speech," it
was necessary to find a plaintiff with standing to bring the challenge. In actual constitutional
litigation, "justiciability" issues, such as standing, are often more crucial than the issues going to
substantive constitutionality. In Doe, I had no doubt that if we could surmount the standing hurdle, the university's "racist speech" policy would be declared void on its face. I do not think that
the very capable lawyer retained by the University to defend the case had any doubt on this score
either. I anticipated that the University's main line of defense would be on the question of standing, as it was, and so I delayed bringing the suit until we could recruit a plaintiff who would
present the strongest case for standing under the Court's current and very restrictive standing
doctrine. Under that doctrine, in order to have standing, the plaintiff must allege (and prove if
controverted) facts sufficient to show "that the injury 'fairly can be traced to the challenged action' and 'is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.'" Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976)).
In a First Amendment case, the "chilling effect" concept that is so important in the substantive "law of the First Amendment" is also relevant to establish the standing of the named plaintiff
to bring an affirmative challenge. It could be argued that any student at the University had standing to challenge the policy because the existence and threatened enforcement of the policy created
a "chilling effect" on the expression of ideas at the University and so directly impacted the university environment of which the student is a part. That is, the policy changed the University environment from one in which inquiry was "free and unfettered" to one in which there was an "officially-imposed orthodoxy." This adverse impact on the university environment is felt by all
students at the University, and so all students would have standing to challenge the policy that
produced the change in the university environment. This argument, focusing on an injury to intangible interests that is widely shared by a large number of persons, is based on Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (users of a national park would have standing to challenge changes
in the environment of the park as a result of a proposed resort development), was made as a
"back-up" argument to support standing in Doe. Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 5-6, Doe (No. 89-CV-71683-DT). However, I was reluctant to make this kind
of injury in fact the sole basis for our standing claim, and because we had a plaintiff with
"stronger" standing, the court found it unnecessary to consider it. 721 F. Supp. at 861 n.9.
The "stronger" standing claim was based on the specific "chilling effect" on the exercise of
First Amendment rights by the named plaintiff resulting from the existence and threatened enforcement of the policy. I endeavored to recruit a plaintiff (the ACLU has a First Amendment
right to recruit plaintiffs to bring constitutional challenges, In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978))
who could allege in good faith that he or she refrained from expressing particular ideas in class
because of the existence and threatened enforcement of the policy, and I was successful in doing
so. The named plaintiff was a graduate student in psychology, whose field of specialty was biopsychology, which he described as the interdisciplinary study of the biological bases of individual
differences in personality traits and mental ability. He alleged that certain controversial theories
positing biologically-based differences between the sexes and among the races might be~perceived
as "sexist" and "racist" by some students, and he feared that discussion of such theories might
subject him to sanction under the policy. 721 F. Supp. at 858.
That the discussion of such theories could subject him to sanction under the policy was supported by the "[w]omen just aren't as good in this field as men" example in the authoritative
guide. See Guide, supra note 34. In his affidavit filed in support of the motion for preliminary
injunction, Doe related this example to questions that he wanted to discuss in his capacity as a
teaching assistant in a course on comparative animal behavior, but that he would not for fear of
sanction under the policy:

1992]

"RACIST SPEECH" BANS

terms applied to "educational and academic centers, such as classroom

buildings, libraries, research laboratories, recreation and study cen' In these areas, students were subject to discipline for verbal
ters." 98
An appropriate topic for discussion in the discussion groups is sexual differences between
male and female mammals, including humans .... [One] hypothesis regarding sex differences in mental abilities, is that men as a group do better than women in some spatially
related mental tasks partly because of a biological difference. This may partly explain, for
example, why many more men than women choose the engineering profession.
Affidavit of John Doe in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 6, Doe (No.
89-CV-71683-DT).
The court found that in light of the example given in the guide, Doe's fear's that he might be
charged with a violation of the policy if he discussed such theories "could not be dismissed as
speculative and conjectural," and that, "[t]he ideas discussed in Doe's field of study bear sufficient
similarity to ideas denounced as 'harassing' in the Guide to constitute a realistic and specific
threat of prosecution." 721 F. Supp. at 860.
The specific "chilling effect" on the exercise of Doe's First Amendment rights resulting from
the existence and threatened enforcement of the University's "racist speech" policy supports what
may be called "subject to" standing. Where the expressive activity in which a party wishes to
engage is subject to the prohibitions of a law, and the party refrains from engaging in that activity
because of the existence of the law and the fear of sanction under it, the resulting "chilling effect"
of the party's exercise of First Amendment rights constitutes present injury in fact for standing
purposes. For illustrative cases (in which the issue was sometimes discussed in terms of "actual
controversy" for declaratory judgment purposes, or "irreparable injury" for injunctive purposes)
see Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975) (bar that had been providing topless dancing
for its patrons subject to "bare breasts" ordinance); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974)
(threat by prosecutor to invoke trespass law against handbilling at shopping center); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (public school teacher subject to state law prohibiting teaching of
evolution); National Student Ass'n v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (college students
holding draft deferments subject to selective service board regulation withdrawing draft deferments for students engaging in "illegal protest activity").
Outside of the First Amendment area, "subject to" standing exists for any party who refrains
from engaging in any action because of the existence of a law and the fear of sanction under it,
such as the standing of a physician who refrains from performing abortions to challenge the constitutionality of an anti-abortion law. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
In Doe v. University of Mich., the court found that Doe's fear of sanctions under the policy,
if he discussed these theories, was credible, not only because of the example in the guide, but
because the University had enforced the policy against students "in the classroom and research
setting who offended others by discussing ideas deemed controversial," and because "the policy
was enforced so broadly and indiscriminately that plaintiff's fears of prosecution were entirely
reasonable." 721 F. Supp. at 861.
97. Its official title was the University of Michigan Policy on Discrimination and Discriminatory Harassment.
98. The policy also appeared to apply in practice to University housing, although by its
terms it did not. The policy states that, "persons should not be required to tolerate discriminatory
behavior in their homes," but goes on to say that "discriminatory conduct" in University housing
was governed by the terms of the leases. University of Michigan, University of Michigan Policy on
Discrimination and Discriminatory Harassment [hereinafter Policy] (preamble). Although we
used examples of complaints filed in the University housing setting, the named plaintiff did not
reside in University housing, and the focus of our challenge was on the impact of the policy in the
academic setting. The district court took the position that the constitutionality of the policy as it
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behavior99 that "(1) . . .stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the

basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national
origin, ancestry, age, marital status, handicap or Vietnam-era veteran
status, and that (2)... [c]reates an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning
environment for educational pursuits, employment or participation in
University sponsored extracurricular activities."100
The policy was unconstitutional because its underlying premises
were inconsistent with the principles of content neutrality, protection of
offensive speech, and heightened protection of expression in the academic context. The policy, reflecting the university's efforts to impose a

secular orthodoxy on campus, was directed against the expression of
racist ideas, and so violated the principle of content neutrality. 01 Likewise, the harm that the prohibited expression purportedly caused to vic-

tim groups was due to the perceived offensiveness of the expression, and
related to "verbal conduct and verbal behavior" in University housing was not put in issue by the
complaint. 721 F. Supp. at 856. It does not appear that after Doe, the University made any
further effort to enforce the policy in University housing.
Under the terms of the policy, there were no restrictions on verbal conduct and verbal behavior in public forums, such as the Quadrangle. The policy also did not apply to University sponsored publications. The underlying theory was that in "dedicated public forums," students were
entitled to the "most wide-ranging freedom of speech," but that "[i]n
academic and educational
centers where the University's educational mission is focused ... discriminatory conduct which
materially impedes the educational process is an object of concern and may be proscribed." Policy,
supra, at pmbl.
99. There was no challenge to the policy insofar as it prohibited physical behavior.
100. 721 F. Supp. at 856. Substantially the same language was included in the sexual harassment provision. That provision defined sexual harassment as "[s]exual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and verbal or physical conduct that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the
basis of sex or sexual orientation.. ..
" Policy, supra note 98. While the litigation was pending,
and after the District Court had set a hearing on the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, the University, without notice to the plaintiff, announced that it was withdrawing the
"[c]reates an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment," 721 F. Supp. at 856, part of the
policy as applied to "educational and academic centers." Id. This withdraw obviously had no
effect on the plaintiff's constitutional challenge, since the University could reinstate the withdrawn
portion of the policy in the future. The court was still required to and did determine the facial
validity of the policy as if the suspended provision had remained in effect. Cf.City of Mesquite v.
Alladin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982); United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629
(1953).
101. As we stated in our brief, using the "women aren't as good in this field as men,"
example: "As the plaintiff has demonstrated in his Affidavit, under the Policy the University has
established a 'secular orthodoxy,' an element of which, illustrated by the above example, is that
'the tenets of feminism are superior to the traditional view of women.' Under the principle of
content neutrality, the government may not 'ordain a preferred viewpoint about women' . . . Nor
may it prescribe the expression of any idea because of the content of that idea or the message it
conveys, in the name of creating a 'non-hostile' environment for students." Brief in Support of
Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 12-13, Doe (No. 89-CV-71683-DT) (alteration in
original).
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the prohibition of the expression on that basis violated the principle of
protection of offensive speech.'" 2 Finally, these restrictions on the expression of racist ideas were imposed by a public university on its students, thus violating the principle of heightened protection of expres03

sion in the academic context.1
The district court, in its opinion, discussed the interaction of these
First Amendment principles in determining that the university's policy
was void on its face for overbreadth, because, by its terms, it reached
"broad categories of speech, a substantial amount of which is constitutionally protected."' 4
102. As we stated in our brief, again using the "women just aren't as good as men" example, it may well be that female students at the University of Michigan would be offended by the
expression of the idea that, "[w]omen just aren't as good in this field as men, or that, 'women are
more suited than men to care for children,' and would find the expression of such ideas to create a
'hostile learning atmosphere' .... [T]he University may not prohibit the expression of any idea, no
matter how offensive the idea of the form in which it is expressed may be to other students. Nor
may the University say that a particular idea is so offensive as to create an 'intimidating, hostile
or demeaning environment for educational pursuits.'" Id. at 13-14 (alteration in original).
103. As we argued in our brief: "The third fundamental First Amendment principle that is
literally trashed by the University's Policy is the principle of heightened protection of expression
in the academic context. . . . As the plaintiff has stated in his Affidavit, the University, in the
name of creating a 'non-hostile environment for students,' has established a 'secular orthodoxy.'
The First Amendment, however, precludes the University from casting a pall of [secular] orthodoxy over the classroom." Id. at 14-15.
104. 721 F. Supp. at 864. The University argued that in practice, the policy did not apply to
"speech that is protected by the First Amendment," and "urged the court to disregard the Guide
as 'inaccurate' and look instead to 'the manner in which the Policy has been interpreted and
applied by those charged with its enforcement.'" Id. at 864-65. The court, looking especially to
the incidents in which the policy was applied to the classroom discussion and remarks, concluded
that, "as applied by the University over the past year, the Policy was consistently applied to reach
protected speech." Id. at 865.
The court also found that the terms of the policy were unconstitutionally vague. The policy
violated "the Due Process Clause, because it did not give fair notice as to what activity was
prohibited by the policy, and also violated the First Amendment, because it "never articulated any
principled way to distinguish sanctionable from protected speech." Id. at 867. The court noted
that the policy referred both to causative language and to the effects of that language on victim
groups. The causative language part contained terms such as "stigmatize" and "victimize," which,
as the court stated, "are general and elude precise definition." Id. Moreover, the fact that a statement may "victimize" or "stigmatize" does not deprive it of "protection under the accepted First
Amendment tests." Id. The "effects" part referred to "interfering with an individual's academic
efforts," which "gives no inherent guidance." In addition, once the interpretive guide was withdrawn as "inaccurate," there was an "implicit admission that even the university itself was unsure
of the precise scope and meaning of the Policy." Id.
The courts do not always sharply distinguish between First Amendment vagueness and due
process vagueness, and often as here, both kinds of vagueness will be present in the same law or
governmental action. Analytically, the difference is that First Amendment vagueness is premised
on a concern for preventing a "chilling effect" on the exercise of First Amendment rights by the
existence and threatened enforcement of a vague law, while due process vagueness is premised on
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What the University could not do, however, was establish.., an anti-discrimination policy which had the effect of prohibiting certain speech because it disagreed
with ideas or messages sought to be conveyed .... Nor could the University
proscribe speech simply because it was found to be offensive, even, gravely so, by
large numbers of people.... These principles acquire a special significance in the
university setting, where the free and unfettered interplay of competing views is
essential to the institution's educational mission.... With these general rules in
mind, the Court can now consider whether the Policy sweeps within its scope
speech which is otherwise protected by the First Amendment." 5

The court enjoined the University from enforcing its racist speech
policy,10 and the University did not appeal.10 7 There could be no serious question that under the law of the First Amendment the University's policy was void on its face, and even the strongest proponents of
bans on racist speech on campus do not contend otherwise.' 0 8
It is important, however, to understand precisely why the University's racist speech policy was void on its face. The policy was not void
on its face, because it was poorly drafted. Rather it was void on its face
because, as the district court stated, it reached a substantial amount of
constitutionally protected speech. And it reached a substantial amount
of constitutionally protected speech, because it was directed against the
expression of racist ideas. It is for this reason that virtually any campus ban on racist speech imposed by a public university will be found
unconstitutional under the law of the First Amendment.
Any campus ban on racist speech, no matter how "limited" and
no matter how purportedly "narrowly drawn," is at its core directed
against the expression of racist ideas, and will necessarily have the effect of sanctioning the expression of racist ideas in the particular circumstances to which it applies.
The underlying justification for restricting racist speech on campus
is that racist speech by its very nature causes discrete and serious harm
the absence of "fair notice" to the accused of what conduct is prescribed by a criminal enactment.
In order to establish the due process claim, the accused must demonstrate that he or she could not
reasonably know that the conduct that formed the basis of the accusation was prohibited by the
law. No such requirement is present in a First Amendment vagueness challenge.
105. Id. at 864.
106. The University was free to enforce the provisions of the policy regulating physical conduct, which, of course, were not challenged in the litigation.
107. Shortly after, the University promulgated an "interim policy," prohibiting the use of
"racial epithets." The constitutionality of a ban on "racial epithets" will be discussed
subsequently.
108. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 3, at 477-78 nn.161-62 ("poorly drafted and obviously
overbroad regulation"); Smolla, supra note 4, at 208 ("failed to confine sufficiently its definition of
covered speech").
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to racial minorities and other victim groups, and so deprives them of
equal educational opportunity. But the harm that is purportedly caused
by racist speech is due to the racist nature of the idea that is being
conveyed and to the impact of that idea on racial minorities and other
victim groups. No matter how limited the circumstances in which the
ban on racist speech applies, it is still the idea itself and the impact of
the idea on the victim that is the justification for the restriction. What
Doe v. University of Michigan makes clear is that under the law of the
First Amendment, a public university cannot prohibit the expression of
racist ideas in any circumstance and for any purpose. It can not do so,
because a campus ban on the expression of racist ideas violates the
important First Amendment principles of content neutrality, the protection of offensive speech, and heightened protection to freedom of expression in the academic context. So long as the ban reaches the expression of racist ideas, as it invariably will, the ban will be found
unconstitutional.
This proposition is clearly demonstrated by UWM Post,"9 in
which the district court invalidated the University of Wisconsin's racist
speech policy." 0 Compared to the University of Michigan's ban, the
University of Wisconsin's ban was decidedly narrow. It applied only to:
intentional "comments, epithets or other expressive behavior" that were
racist or discriminatory, "directed at an individual," "[d]emean[ed] the
race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual orientation, national
origin, ancestry or age of the individual" addressed, and that
"[c]reate[ed] an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment for
education, university-related work, or other university-authorized activity.""' It specifically excluded from its coverage comments made during class discussion." 2 According to the lawyer who was the principal
drafter of the ban, "compliance with the [F]irst [A]mendment became
the focus of the regulatory effort," 13 and "what emerged was a narrow
rule based principally on the [F]irst [A]mendment 'fighting words' doc109.

UMW Post v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D.

Wis. 1991).

110. The University of Wisconsin is a multi-campus system, and the policy applied to all
campuses in the system.
111. 774 F. Supp. at 1165-66.
112. Id. Like the University of Michigan, the University of Wisconsin issued an authoritative guide to students. One example of a non-violation was the same kind of "men are better in
this field than women" statement in class that was listed as a violation in the University of Michigan's authoritative guide. Id. at 1167.
113. Patricia Hodulik, Racist Speech on Campus, 37 WAYNE L. REV. 1433, 1437 (1991).
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trine, and incorporating equal opportunity concepts that prohibit
demeaning expressive behavior that creates a hostile environment for
minorities. 114 In commenting on this ban prior to the decision, I observed that: "it still has overbreadth and vagueness problems, due to
the use of the 'intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment' concept,
reaches the
and due to the fact that, whether intended or not, it still
''15
basis.
one-to-one
a
on
albeit
ideas,'
'racist
of
expression
The court in UWM Post, like the court in Doe v. University of
Michigan, invalidated the ban on its face for overbreadth."16 The
court's primary focus was on the fact that the ban violated the principle of content neutrality. The University advanced the oft-repeated justification that the ban was necessary to prevent the harmful effects of
racist speech on racial minorities and other victim groups and to provide these students with equal educational opportunity. 1 7 The problem
with this justification, however, as the court made clear in the same
manner as did the court in Doe, is that in order to do so, the ban prohibited the expression of racist ideas, and therefore, regulated speech
because of its content. As the court stated:
It is clear, however, that the UW Rule regulates speech based on its content. The'
rule disciplines students whose comments, epithets or other expressive behavior
demeans their addressees' race, sex, religion, etc .... However, the rule leaves
unregulated comments, epithets and other expressive behavior which affirms or
does not address an individual's race, sex, religion, etc.118

In response to the University's argument that the court should balance
the "minimum social value" of racist speech against the harm that it
caused to minority students and other victim groups and to the educational environment, the court replied that a balancing approach was
appropriate only with respect to content-neutral speech regulation."'
As pointed out previously, when a First Amendment principle such
as content neutrality is applicable, no balancing takes place, and the
application of the First Amendment principle controls the result.
Stated simply, as UWM Post makes clear, a public university cannot
114. Id.
115. Sedler, supra note 29, at 1343 n.54.
116. The court also found impermissible vagueness due to ambiguity in that the rule was
unclear on the question of whether the speaker "must actually create a hostile educational environment or if he must merely intend to do so." UMW Post, 774 F. Supp. at 1179.
117. Id. at 1176-77.
118. Id. at 1174.
119. Id. at 1173.
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protect minority students and other members of victim groups from the
harmful effects of racist speech by prohibiting the expression of racist
ideas in any circumstances. It can not do so because any prohibition on
the expression of racist ideas, no matter what the circumstances, violates the principle of content neutrality. 20
UWM Post makes it clear then that narrow bans on racist speech,
such as those that are limited to "direct, face-to-face racial insults"
and "targeted vilification," as proposed by Professor Charles Lawrence, 121 also violate the First Amendment. Lawrence has analogized
face-to-face racial insults to "fighting words:"
[t]he Supreme Court has held that words that "by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace" are not constitutionally protected .... Face-to-face racial insults, like fighting words, are undeserving of first amendment protection for two reasons. The first reason is the immediacy of the injurious impact of racial insults ....The second reason ... relates to
the underlying purpose of the first amendment. If the purpose of the first amendment is to foster the greatest amount of speech, then racial insults disserve that
intention is not to discover truth or
purpose . . . . [B]ecause the perpetrator's
122
initiate dialogue but to injure the victim.

While face-to-face racial insults, unlike fighting words, will not provoke
a violent response with a resulting breach of the peace, Professor Lawrence argues that this should not matter, since "the preemptive effect
120. The court went on, however, to find that even under the balancing test proposed by the
University, the ban would still be unconstitutional. Here, the court emphasized that contrary to
the University's assertion, "racist speech" was indeed intended to inform the listeners of the
speaker's "racist or discriminatory views," id. at 1175, and in effect invoking the principle of
protection of offensive speech, noted that, "the speech the rule prohibits would be protected for its
expression of the speaker's emotions," id. In response to the University's contention that the ban
was necessary to promote diversity by increasing the representation of minority students, the court
noted that: "However, the UW Rule does as much to hurt diversity on Wisconsin campuses as it
does to help it. By establishing content-based restrictions on speech, the rule limits the diversity of
ideas among students and thereby prevents the 'robust exchange of ideas' which intellectually
diverse campuses provide." Id. at 1176.
121. Lawrence, supra note 3, at 437. Lawrence argues that the First Amendment permits
"narrowly drafted provisions aimed at racist speech that results in direct, immediate and substantial injury." Id. These would include both face-to-face racial insults and "racial epithets and vilification that do not involve face-to-face encounters--situations in which the victim is a captive
audience and the injury is experienced by all members of a racial group who are forced to hear or
see these words because the insulting words are aimed at the entire group." Id.
122. Id. at 451-52 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942), the
only case where the Supreme Court has ever found that expression constituted fighting words).
The operative holding of Chaplinsky, however, did not relate to the "psychic harm" caused by the
"fighting words," but to their tendency to "incite an immediate breach of the peace." See Strossen, supra note 6, at 508.
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on further speech is just as complete as with fighting words."'12 3 Thus
he contends they should be treated as the "functional equivalent" of
fighting words and so should not be protected by the First
Amendment.' 24
The functional equivalent of fighting words argument has been advanced by Professor Lawrence and others, x2 5 in misplaced reliance on
language contained in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,126 the case in
which the Court promulgated the fighting words exception to the First
Amendment, and the only case incidentally in which the Court ever
applied that exception to uphold the constitutionality of a ban on expression. The Court in Chaplinsky defined fighting words as "those
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.' 12 The operative holding in Chaplinsky, however, did not relate to the "psychic harm" caused by the fighting words,
but to their tendency to "incite an immediate breach of the peace.' 128
This, of course, was exactly the premise of the University of Wisconsin ban which was invalidated in the UWM Post case. The University there made the identical arguments that have been advanced by
Professor Lawrence. The University attempted to analogize its ban on
targeted racist speech to a ban on fighting words, arguing in effect, as
does Lawrence, that racist speech is the functional equivalent of fighting words. This attempt failed for the simple reason that the ban was
not limited to fighting words, and while the First Amendment does not
protect fighting words, it does protect what Lawrence calls the functional equivalent of them.
When the University tried to bring its racist speech ban within the
fighting words exception, the court noted that in Chaplinsky the Supreme Court did set out a two-part definition for fighting words: (1)
words which by their very utterance inflict injury, and (2) words which
by their very utterance tend to incite an immediate breach of the
123. Lawrence, supra note 3, at 452.
124. Id. at 453-54. Professor Lawrence then makes the point that "the fighting words doctrine is a paradigm based on a white male point of view," id. at 454, because it "presupposes an
encounter between two persons of relatively equal power who have been acculturated to respond to
face-to-face insults," id. at 453-54. Racial minority persons will not make a violent response to
"fighting words," because they "correctly perceive that a violent response to fighting words will
result in a risk to their own life and limb." Id. at 454.
125. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Civil Rights vs. Civil Liberties: The Case of Discriminatory Verbal Harassment, 8 Soc. PHIL. & PoL'Y 81, 92-96 (1991).
126. 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
127. 315 U.S. at 572.
128. See Strossen, supra note 6, at 508-09.
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peace. 12 The court noted that "[t]he two parts of the fighting words
definition correspond to different concerns regarding reactions to offensive expressions." 130 The first half "relates to the prevention of psychological injury, primarily in the form of emotional upset and injury to
the 'sensibilities' of addressees." 131 The second half "addresses the prevention of physical retaliation likely to cause a breach of the peace.' ' 2
However, the court went on to say that in Chaplinsky, the state
supreme court "applied only the second half [of the definition]."133 The

state law in issue had been construed by the state supreme court as
reaching only language which tends to incite an immediate breach of
the peace, and the Supreme Court held that the law, as limited in its
scope by the state supreme court, did not violate the First Amendment. 3 The UWM Post court then pointed out that in subsequent decisions the Supreme Court "has limited the fighting words definition so
that it now only includes ...

[the] second half [of the definition]."'3

Thus, the fighting words exception applies to words which by their very
utterance tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace-what we
have referred to as a one-to-one invitation to a fight. Since the University of Wisconsin ban did not require that the regulated speech, by its
very utterance, have a tendency to incite violent reaction, it went "beyond the present scope of the fighting words doctrine,"' 6 and
"cover[ed] a substantial number of situations where no breach of the
peace is likely to result.

..."I This being so, the ban failed to meet

fighting words doctrine, and so was void on its
the requirements of the
38
face for overbreadth.
129.

UMW Post v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1169

(E.D. Wis. 1991).

130. Id. at 1169.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1169-70.
133. Id. at 1170.
134. Id.
135. Id. The court cited two Supreme Court overbreadth decisions, Gooding v. Wilson, 405
U.S. 518 (1972), and Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974), and the Court's recent reference in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1991), to that "small class of 'fighting words' that
are "likely to provoke the average person to retaliation and thereby cause a breach of the peace."
Id. at 1170-71.
136. UMW Post, 774 F. Supp. at 1172.
137. Id. at 1172-73.
138. Id. at 1173. Professor Lawrence has used as a model of permissible regulation of
"face-to-face racial insults" the "harassment by vilification" provision of the Fundamental Standard Interpretation: Free Expression and Discriminatory Harassment, adopted by Stanford University June 1990. Harassment by vilification is defined as speech or other expression intended to
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Fighting words are not constitutionally protected, because they are

an invitation to a fight rather than the expression of an idea, and so
amount to an illegal verbal act for First Amendment purposes.' But
the expression of racist ideas on a one-to-one basis is protected by the
First Amendment in the same manner as the expression of any other
idea on a one-to-one basis, notwithstanding the fact that racist ideas
are intended to "stigmatize"' 4 the person to whom they are addressed

and may cause discrete and serious harm to that person. In short, for
First Amendment purposes, there is no such thing as the functional

equivalent of fighting words. Unless the particular expression comes
within the extremely narrow definition of fighting words-a one-to-one

invitation to a fight-it is a protected expression for First Amendment
purposes and can not be proscribed because of its content. This is true
regardless of the harmful impact that it may have on the recipient.
As Doe v. University of Michigan and the UWM Post case make

clear, any campus ban on racist speech, no matter how purportedly
limited, that reaches the expression of racist ideas violates the First

Amendment. Under the principle of content neutrality, a public university cannot ban the expression of racist ideas in any circumstance or for
any .purpose. It is also completely irrelevant, from a constitutional
standpoint, that the expression of racist ideas may cause serious and
discrete harm to racial minorities and other victim groups. To say that
the harm caused by the expression of racist ideas is constitutionally
irrelevant is not to deny or demean the significance of such harm.
insult or stigmatize an individual or a small number of individuals on the basis of race, etc., and
"is addressed directly to the individual or individuals whom it insults or stigmatizes" and "makes
use of insulting or "fighting" words or non-verbal symbols." Lawrence, supra note 3, at 450-51.
See also Grey, supra note 125, at 93-96 (discussing the Stanford ban). As the UWM Post case
makes clear, there is no doubt that such a harassment by vilification rule, if adopted by a public
university, would be found to violate the First Amendment, since it goes beyond the prohibition of
constitutionally unprotected "fighting words" to reach the constitutionally protected expression of
"racist ideas."
139. See infra notes 161-65 and accompanying text (discussing "verbal acts"). As to the
limitation of the "fighting words" exception to a one-to-one invitation to a fight, see Strossen,
supra note 6, at 508-09; TRIBE, supra note 65, at 929 n.9. As Professor Strossen puts it,"[u]nder
the Court's current view, even facially valid laws that restrict fighting words may be applied constitutionally only in circumstances where their utterance almost certainly will lead to immediate
violence." Strossen, supra' note 6, at 509. This point is supported by the Court's definition of
"fighting words" in Texas v. Johnson, where it referred to that "small class of 'fighting words'
that are 'likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the
peace.'" 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574
(1942)).
140. It will be recalled that in Doe v. University of Michigan, the term, "stigmatize," was
held to be impermissibly vague. 721 F. Supp. 852, 866-67.
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Rather it is to recognize that the fact that expression causes psychic or
emotional harm to persons can not be an independent justification for
restricting it. The components that comprise the law of the First

Amendment do not take account of the psychic or emotional harm to
persons that may result from acts of expression. 1 ' Where such harm
does result, it is the price, so to speak, that the victims of the harm
must pay for the larger good that is deemed to be advanced by the high
degree of protection to freedom of expression that is provided by the
1
First Amendment.

42

141. This proposition is clearly illustrated by Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S.
46 (1988), where the Court held that the rule of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964), imposing the stringent requirement of knowing falsity or reckless disregard for truth, applied in a tort action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress brought by a "public figure." There a well-known religious leader claimed to have suffered severe emotional distress as a
result of a crude parody in a sexually-oriented publication, accusing him of having committed
incest with his mother. He argued that: "so long as the utterance was intended to inflict emotional
distress, was outrageous, and did in fact inflict serious emotional distress, it is of no constitutional
import whether the statement was a fact or an opinion, or whether it was true or false." Hustler
Magazine, 485 U.S. at 53. In rejecting this argument, the Court stated that, "while such a bad
motive may be deemed controlling for purposes of tort liability in other areas of the law, we think
the First Amendment prohibits such a result in the area of public debate about public figures." Id.
Thus, the New York Times rule applied to limit recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress, despite the serious and discrete harm that the expression caused to the victim. Again, the
existence of this harm was completely irrelevant to the operation of this specific doctrine of the
"law of the First Amendment."
Similarly, in the recent case of Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. Crime Control
Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991), where the Court applied the principle of content neutrality to invalidate New York's "Son of Sam" law, the Court noted that the state did not, "assert any interest in
limiting whatever anguish Henry Hill's victims may suffer from reliving their victimization." Id.
at 509.
142. For a comprehensive discussion of the Court's unwillingness to deny First Amendment
protection to expression that causes persons to suffer emotional harm, see David Goldberger,
Sources of Judicial Reluctance to Use Psychic Harm as a Basis for Suppressing Racist, Sexist
and Ethnically Offensive Speech, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1165 (1991).
It is also completely irrelevant, under the "law of the First Amendment," that "racist speech"
is purportedly inconsistent with the equality value of the Fourteenth Amendment. As a constitutional matter, "racist speech" does not involve any tension between the Fourteenth Amendment's
equality guarantee and the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of expression. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the state from engaging in invidious racial discrimination; the First
Amendment prohibits the state from abridging freedom of expression. These guarantees do not
conflict in the sense that one cannot be asserted to justify what would otherwise be a violation of
the other. For example, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause prohibits the states
from operating racially-segregated public schools, and the states cannot justify racial segregation
in the public schools on the ground that whites should have a freedom of association right not to
associate with blacks in public facilities. See Robert A. Sedler, The Constitution and School
Segregation:An Inquiry into the Nature of the Substantive Right, 68 Ky. L.J. 879, 939-40 (197980). By the same token, the First Amendment principles of content neutrality, protection of offensive speech, and heightened protection to freedom of expression in the academic context prohibit a
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Another type of purportedly narrow limitation on racist speech
that has been proposed by Professor Lawrence is the protection of the
captive audience. Professor Lawrence has argued that a public university should be able to restrict "racial epithets and vilification . . .
[where] the victim is a captive audience and the injury is experienced
by all members of a racial group who are forced to hear or see these
words [because] the insulting words, in effect, are aimed at the entire
group.' 43 In support of this position, he states that, "the regulation of
otherwise protected speech has been permitted when the speech invades
the privacy of the unwilling listener's home or when the unwilling listener cannot avoid the speech."' 44
Professor Lawrence relies on Kovacs v. Cooper,4" where the Court
upheld a ban on loud and raucous amplifiers on city streets (which presumably would prevent the use of most soundtrucks), and two cases
directly involving the privacy of the home, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,'46 and Rowan v. United States Post Office Department.147 In
Pacifica Foundation the Court held that the FCC could restrict the
broadcasting of "offensive language" over the radio in the middle of
the day. In Rowan the Court upheld a federal law that enabled an
unwilling recipient of advertisements for sexually explicit material to
prevent them from coming into the home. As regards speech invading
the privacy of the home, Professor Lawrence could have added Frisby
v. Schultz, 48 where the Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting "focused picketing" directed against a person in front of the person's
home.
With respect to the law of the First Amendment, all of these cases
essentially involve the specific doctrine of reasonable, time, place and
manner regulation: a reasonable and content neutral regulation of expression in terms of time, place and manner is not an abridgment of
speech under the First Amendment. 49 The most "reasonable" regulapublic university from restricting the expression of "racist speech" on campus. The public university cannot get out from under the First Amendment and justify the otherwise unconstitutional

restriction on the ground that this is necessary to provide equal educational opportunity for racial
minorities and other victim groups.
143. Lawrence, supra note 3, at 437.
144. Id. at 456.

145.
146.

336 U.S. 77 (1949).
438 U.S. 726 (1978).

147.
148.
149.

397 U.S. 728 (1970).
487 U.S. 474 (1988).
See Law of the First Amendment, supra note 7, at 476-80.
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tion of expression is one that enables an unwilling listener to avoid
speech in the privacy of the home. As the court stated in Frisby v.
Schultz:
[t]he State's interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the
home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society ....
One
important aspect of residential privacy is protection of the unwilling listener. Although in many locations, we expect individuals simply to avoid speech they do
not want to hear, the home is different . . . [i]ndividuals are not required to
welcome unwanted speech into their own homes and . . . the government may
protect this freedom. 1 0

There would be no constitutional problem, therefore, with a university regulation that enabled a student to exclude unwanted speech,
racist or otherwise, from her or his dormitory room. Such a regulation
could authorize a student to put up a notice stating, "post nothing on
the door to my room and put nothing under the door." This would be a
content-neutral place regulation, designed to protect the student from
unwanted speech in the privacy of the student's dormitory room.
Professor Lawrence, however, while invoking the privacy of the
home principle, dramatically departs from that principle and would impose restrictions directed at protecting students from racist speech in
common living spaces and even over the entire campus. He states as
follows:
Racist posters, flyers, and graffiti in dorms, classrooms, bathrooms, and other
common living spaces would fall within the reasoning of these cases. Minority
students should not be required to remain in their rooms to avoid racial assault.
Minimally, they should find a safe haven in their dorms and other common
rooms that are a part of their daily routine. I would argue that the university's
responsibility for ensuring these students received an equal educational opportunity provides a compelling justification for regulations that ensure them safe passage in all common areas. A black, latino, Asian or Native American student
should not have to risk being the target of racially assaulting speech every time
she chooses to walk across campus.'

The premise here apparently is that minority and other victim group
students are a captive audience on the university campus and so must
be protected against racially assaulting speech. 152
Professor Lawrence does not define precisely what he means by
"racially assaulting speech," but presumably his definition goes beyond
150.
151.
152.

487 U.S. at 484 (citations omitted).
Lawrence, supra note 3, at 456-57.
Id. at 457.

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:631

racial epithets and includes the targeted expression of racist ideas. I am
assuming that he would find a poster on a white student's dormitory
room door saying, "Blacks are inferior and don't belong at this university," to be racially assaulting speech just as he would a poster containing the same message, but substituting "niggers" for "blacks." If I am
correct in this assumption, as I think I am, then it is the content of the
message and its offensiveness to the victim that makes it racially assaulting speech under Professor Lawrence's view, regardless of whether
or not the message uses racial epithets.
Thus, the ban on racially assaulting speech contravenes the First
Amendment principles of content neutrality and the protection of offensive speech, and when imposed by a public university, the principle of
heightened protection of expression in the academic context. As we
have emphasized, because of these important First Amendment principles, a public university cannot protect minority students from unwanted exposure to racist ideas. This is no less true when the students
are in common rooms or going across the campus than it is when they
are in the classroom. To contend that because the government can enable persons to exclude unwanted speech from the privacy of their
homes, a public university can protect its minority students as a captive
audience from racist speech on the university campus is a "misanalogy" that cannot be supported under the law of the First Amendment. A regulation that enables a person to exclude unwanted
messages from the home or from a dormitory room can be sustained as
a reasonable time, place and manner regulation designed to support an
individual's privacy in the home. But a university campus is not a
home, and once a student leaves the dormitory room, the university can
no longer assert an interest in protecting the privacy of the home. Thus,
the doctrine of reasonable (and content-neutral) time, place and manner regulation is no longer applicable, and under the applicable First
Amendment principles-content neutrality, protection of offensive
speech, and heightened protection of expression in the academic context-a ban on racially assaulting speech on a university campus
clearly violates the First Amendment.
The constitutional analysis would be different if a public university
merely prohibited the use of racial epithets. Assuming that the university succeeds in defining the proscribed racial epithets with sufficient
precision to withstand a vagueness or overbreadth challenge, which, in
my opinion, it could only do by specifically proscribing particular racial
epithets and kindred words, it could try to justify the restriction as a
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reasonable time, place and manner regulation. It would argue that such
a restriction is appropriate on a university campus in order to promote
civilized discourse and to protect the injury to racial minorities and
other victim groups that the use of racial epithets is deemed to cause.
And there is certainly no need for any one to express any idea by the
use of racial epithets. Under such a restriction, a student could put up
a poster saying, "Blacks are inferior and don't belong at the university," but not a poster substituting the racial epithet "niggers" for
"blacks."
It may be noted that proponents of bans on racist speech such as
Professor Lawrence, while making copious use of racial epithets to illustrate racially assaultive speech, have never proposed a ban limited
only to the use of racial epithets. And in all fairness, such an extremely
limited ban would not accomplish their objective of protecting minority
students from the harm that they contend results from racist speech.
The perceived harm is only marginally less when the message is
"blacks are inferior," than it is when the message is, "niggers are inferior." In any event, for present purposes, it is sufficient to note that a
ban on the use of racial epithets could possibly be sustained as a reasonable time, place and manner limitation on expression on a university
campus.
Especially is this so in the one place on a university campus where
racial epithets are not likely to be used at all, the classroom. Today it is
difficult to perceive of a situation when even the most racist professor
or student would use racial epithets in the classroom. But in the completely hypothetical situation where a professor would use them, it can
be contended that this is an act of discrimination directed against minority students: it serves no purpose other than to make them feel inferior and unwanted in the classroom. 15 3 Likewise, if a student would try
to use racial epithets, the professor doubtless could prohibit the student
from using such language that has no place in the civilized discourse of
the classroom. 154
Outside of the confines of the classroom, however, a ban on the use
of racial epithets becomes more difficult to sustain as a reasonable
153. As to the prohibition of acts of discrimination on the part of faculty members, see
infra note 170 and accompanying text.
154. The professor's right to maintain a suitable level of discourse in the classroom would
give the professor the right to prohibit the use of unseemly expletives that would otherwise be
permissible on the streets or in a public building. Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)
(court holding that public display of jacket with the message "Fuck the Draft" was protected
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
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time, place and manner limitation. 155 The matter of maintaining an appropriate level of discourse becomes quite diffuse when applied to the
university campus as a whole. This is particularly true if the university
has made no other effort to prescribe an appropriate level of discourse
except for the ban on racial epithets. By singling out racial epithets in
this way, the regulation may violate the category neutrality aspect of
the content neutrality principle. Moreover, the ban on the use of racial

epithets is premised on the offensiveness of this expression, thereby implicating the principle of protection of offensive speech. For these rea-

sons, I think it is highly problematical that a ban on the use of racial
epithets, going beyond the classroom and applied to the campus as a

whole, could be sustained as a reasonable time, place and manner
regulation.
It must be emphasized again that most campus bans on racist
speech are by no means limited to racial epithets, and the proponents

of such bans do not try to justify them as being nothing more than a
reasonable time place and manner limitation. Campus bans on racist
speech are directed against the expression of racist ideas, and these

bans, no matter how purportedly narrowly-framed or how justified, can
not be sustained under the First Amendment because they are inconsis-

tent with the First Amendment principles of content neutrality, protection of offensive speech, and heightened protection of expression in the
academic context. For better or for worse, this is the result that obtains
56
in reality.'
155. Racial epithets addressed to a person on a one-to-one basis could be proscribed if they
amount to fighting words, or if they are a part of a course of conduct amounting to the intentional
infliction of emotional distress, as will be discussed in the next section of the article.
156. Most of the academic debate over campus bans on "racist speech" and over "racist
speech" generally has centered around whether such speech should be protected under the First
Amendment. In a perceptive and penetrating article, Professor Mar Matsuda has argued that the
Supreme Court should make a categorical exception for "[riacist speech" and hold that it lies
outside of the protections of the First Amendment. See Matsuda, supra note 4. Professor Matsuda
contends that, "racist speech is best treated as a sui generis category, presenting an idea so historically untenable, so dangerous, and so tied to perpetuation of violence and degradation of the very
classes of human beings who are least equipped to respond that it is properly treated as outside
the realm of protected discourse." Id. at 2357. She lists three identifying characteristics of "racist
speech": (1) The message is of racial inferiority; (2) The message is directed against a historically
oppressed group; and (3) The message is persecutorial, hateful and degrading. Id. Professor Matsuda goes on to say:
The alternative to recognizing racist speech as qualitatively different because of its content
is to continue to stretch existing first amendment exceptions, such as the "fighting words"
doctrine and the "content"/'conduct" distinction. This stretching ultimately weakens the
first amendment fabric, creating neutral holes that remove protection for many forms of
speech. Setting aside the worst forms of racist speech for special treatment is a non-neu-
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Regardless of what the academic commentators may be saying

about campus bans on racist speech, a public university that has imposed such a ban or is considering whether or not to impose one must
understand that the ban will invariably be declared unconstitutional

when it is challenged in court. The public universities, therefore, may
decide that this enterprise is not worth the cost, and instead turn their
attention to more meaningful and constitutionally valid ways of provid-

ing equality of educational opportunity for all of their students.
V.

EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY ON THE UNIVERSITY
CAMPUS

Public universities have many constitutionally permissible means
at their disposal to protect the personal and educational welfare of minority students and other victim groups. 157 Moreover, they can promote
tral, value-laden approach that will better preserve free speech.
Id.
As Professor Matsuda clearly recognizes, bans on "racist speech" are directed against the
expression of racist ideas, and, it is precisely for this reason, as we have demonstrated, that such
bans will be found unconstitutional under the "law of the First Amendment." As the academic
debate continues, it is important to define the parameters of the debate, and to have a clear
understanding of the difference between views about what the First Amendment should mean and
what the First Amendment does mean in the context of actual litigation. Under the "law of the
First Amendment," as it now exists, campus bans on "racist speech" imposed by public universities will be found unconstitutional when challenged in court, and the academic debate over restrictions of "racist speech" on campus should take place with full recognition of this very salient
reality.
157. In Doe v. University of Michigan, Judge Cohn began his analysis of the constitutional
issue with a discussion of the scope of permissible regulation. He first listed all the ways that the
legal system provides protection against discrimination and harmful conduct: (1) the Constitution
and federal and state laws prohibit discrimination in employment, education, and governmental
benefits on the basis of race, sex, ethnicity and religion; (2) Michigan law provides criminal and
civil remedies for assault and battery and specifically prohibits assault and property damage for
purposes of ethnic intimidation; (3) federal law, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1988), and 18 U.S.C.
§§ 241-242 (1988), imposes civil and criminal sanctions against persons depriving or conspiring to
deprive others of federal constitutional rights; (4) many forms of sexually abusive and harassing
conduct are actionable, including abduction, rape, and other forms of criminal sexual conduct; (5)
the dissemination of legally obscene materials is a crime under Michigan law; (6) a civil remedy is
available for women who are subject to quid pro quo sexual harassment in employment, and both
racial minorities and women are protected from a hostile or offensive workplace work environment. 721 F. Supp. 852, 861-62. He then noted that, "[t]he First Amendment presents no obstacle to the establishment of internal University sanctions as to any of these categories of conduct,
over and above any remedies already supplied by state or federal law." Id. at 862.
Judge Cohn then reviewed the categories of speech that were not protected by the First
Amendment. These eluded fighting words, as defined in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1942), noting that under certain circumstances, racial and ethnic epithets, slurs and insults
could fall within this description. 721 F. Supp. at 862. They might also be sufficient to state a
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equality of educational opportunity in the most meaningful way by
making a strong and demonstrable institutional commitment to educational diversity on the university campus.
First and foremost in regard to protecting the personal and educational welfare of minority students and other victim groups is the university's prohibition of all discrimination on the basis of race, gender,
sexual orientation, and the like, and the vigorous enforcement of its

anti-discrimination policy. In this connection, it should be emphasized
that acts of discriminationare not protected by the First Amendment
even though they may take the form of words or writing. This is an

application of the broader principle that conduct otherwise unlawful,
such as perjury, solicitation to crime, misrepresentation, and the like,
does not cease to be unlawful merely because it is carried out by means
of written or verbal expression. These verbal acts may be proscribed,
because they do not implicate freedom of speech within the meaning of
the First Amendment.' 5" As the Court has stated: "it has never been

deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course
claim for the common law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. So too are credible
threats of violence or property damage made with the specific intent to intimidate the victim
because of race, sex, religion or national origin are subject to both criminal and civil sanction
under Michigan law. Also unprotected is "speech which has the effect of inciting imminent lawless
action and which is likely to incite such action," id-.
at 862-63 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969)), and speech that is legally obscene under the test of Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973). In addition, the university could subject all speech and conduct to "reasonable
and nondiscriminatory time, place, and manner restrictions which are narrowly tailored and which
leave open ample alternative means of communication." Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 863. As he concluded: "If the Policy had the effect of only regulating in these areas, it is unlikely that any
constitutional problem would have arisen." Id. at 863.
158. The verbal acts that are not protected because they are not freedom of speech within
the meaning of the First Amendment include the proverbial false cry of fire in a crowded theater.
Here the speaker is not trying to convey an idea, but is trying to induce conduct as an automatic
response to the statement. This effort to induce conduct, rather than to convey an idea, is a verbal
act rather than speech for First Amendment purposes, and since it is a verbal act with harmful
consequences, it may be prescribed without regard to the First Amendment. However, when it is
the speech itself that is made unlawful-as opposed to speech that is an integral part of unlawful
conduct-what is involved is freedom of speech for First Amendment purposes and not an unlawful act. Compare the situation where there is a fire in a crowded theater located in the upper level
of a building, and the speaker says: "Disregard the signs saying to take the stairs in case of fire.
Let's take the elevator and get out of here before we all are crushed to death on the stairs." Here
the speaker is expressing an idea, invoking the listener's cognition and trying to persuade the
listener to take certain action. The idea the speaker is expressing may be an unsound idea, but it is
an idea rather than a verbal act and so is freedom of speech for First Amendment purposes.
Whether the state can sanction the expression of the idea in these circumstances thus requires a
First Amendment analysis, and the constitutional permissibility of the state's effort to sanction the
expression will be determined under the "law of the First Amendment."
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of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced or carried out by means of language ... "1159
That acts of discrimination taking the form of words or writing are
not protected by the First Amendment is illustrated by Pittsburgh
Press v. Human Relations Commission,6 ' where the Court upheld
against First Amendment challenge an order forbidding a newspaper to
carry sex-designated help-wanted advertisements. What was being enjoined here was not expression, but an illegal activity, the practicing of
sex discrimination by the use of sex-designated help-wanted advertisements. The newspaper would be free, of course, to criticize the prohibition against its carrying sex-designated help-wanted acts-such criticism would involve the expression of an idea-but it could not claim
First Amendment protection for its act of illegal sex-discrimination. So
too, a verbal or written request for sex by a supervisor, accompanied by
an explicit or implicit threat of disadvantageous treatment if the employee refuses, may be found to constitute quid pro quo sexual harassment and thus amount to prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex
under federal and state civil rights laws. 6 '
The relationship between the parties may impose a duty on one ofthe parties to refrain from engaging in acts of discrimination and to
that extent to refrain from "racist speech" in the context of that relationship. So, when an employee of a place of public accommodation
addresses derogatory and humiliating racial or ethnic epithets to a customer, that employee has caused the customer to suffer differential
treatment on the basis of race or ethnicity-to use the language of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the customer has been denied the
"full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation . .

.

without discrimination or segregation on the ground of

race."' 62 A number of cases in which this kind of activity has occurred
have involved claims for tort recovery for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress or insult, which the courts have sometimes allowed
and sometimes rejected. These cases are more properly treated as discrimination cases, actionable under federal and state anti-discrimina159. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949).
160. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
161. Some forms of "racist speech" may be prohibited on the ground that they are the
vehicle for carrying out prohibited discrimination and so are not freedom of speech within the
meaning of the First Amendment.
162. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1988).
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tion laws, regardless of whether or not the conduct complained of
amounts to a common law tort. 163
Likewise, when an employer or a supervisor directs derogatory and
humiliating racial, ethnic or sexual epithets to an employee, this may
have the effect of creating a hostile working environment, and if it does
it amounts to prohibited employment discrimination. Again, because of
the employer-employee relationship, the employer or supervisor may be
constrained from engaging in activity-which includes addressing epithets to the employee-that have the effect of creating a hostile working environment. Cases involving this type of behavior have sometimes

arisen in the context of common law tort claims, and like the public
64
accommodation cases, should be treated as discrimination claims.1
Professor Love contends that, "[t]he existence of antidiscrimina163. See, e.g., Wiggs v. Courshon, 355 F. Supp. 206, 208 (S.D. Fla.), appeal dismissed,
485 F.2d 1281 (1973) (When a black customer complained about a missing item in his food order,
the waitress exclaimed, "[y]ou can't talk to me like that, you black son-of-a-bitch ... I will kill
you," and then shouted repeatedly from the kitchen, "they are clothing but a bunch of niggers.");
Irving v. J.L. Marsh, Inc., 360 N.E.2d 983, 984 (Ill. App. 1977) (In order to obtain a refund for
merchandise returned to defendant's store, a black customer was forced to sign a slip which the
salesperson had written, "[a]rrogant Nigger refused exchange--says he doesn't like products.");
Dawson v. Zayre Dep't Stores, 499 A.2d 648 (Pa. Super. 1985) (In dispute over a lay-away ticket,
defendant's sales clerk called customer a "nigger.").
164. One such case is Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. I11. 1984) (Where in an
argument with a black employee, the employer stated, "all you niggers are alike." When the
employee walked away, the employer followed him, and continued to call him a "nigger." 583 F.
Supp. at 925. When the employee objected to the employer's use of racial epithets and said that
he wanted to be treated "like a human being," the employer replied, "[y]ou're not a human being,
you're a nigger." Id. The employee left his job and never returned.). Another example is Gomez v.
Hug, 645 P.2d 916 (Kan. App. 1982) (A member of the Board of County Commissioners directed
ethnic epithets toward Hispanic county employees, including statements such as, "fucking spic,"
"fucking mexican greaser," "pile of shit," and as a result of which the employee feared that he
would lose his job.). Other cases include: Lay v. Roux Laboratories, Inc., 379 So. 2d 451, 452
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (When a black woman employee parked her car in a reserved place in
the company parking lot, a, white male supervisor threatened her with the loss of her job, and
directed "humiliating language, vicious verbal attacks, [and] racial epithets" at her, including
calling her a "nigger."); Alcorn v. Ambro Engineering, Inc., 468 P.2d 216, 217 (Cal. 1970)
(When black employee, who was a shop steward, told employer that he had told another employee
that he should not drive a certain truck to the job site, employer shouted at employee in a rude
and insolent manner: "You goddam 'niggers' are not going to tell me about the rules ... I don't
want any 'niggers' working for me... I am getting rid of all the 'niggers' .. . you're fired."). For
a case where the court held that derogatory ethnic remarks, e.g., "all the other f-ing Jewish
broads around here . . . think they are something special and deserve more than the others,"
directed by an employer to an employee, following which she left her job, amounted to prohibited
employment discrimination, see Imperial Diner, Inc. v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 417
N.E.2d 525, 527 (1980).
The above example cases are all taken from Jean C. Love, DiscriminatorySpeech and the
Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 123, 159 (1990).
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tion legislation can serve as a basis for the courts to tailor the cause of

action for intentional infliction of emotional distress to meet the needs
of the victims of discriminatory speech." 165 In commenting on Professor
Love's article at a Conference on Offensive and Libelous Speech, held

at Washington and Lee Law School, March 31, 1990, I expressed misgivings over Professor Love's use of the concept of "discriminatory
speech." Where so-called "discriminatory speech" amounts to a prohibited act of discrimination, as in most of the examples cited in Professor
Love's article, the "discriminatory speech" is not protected. But this is
only and precisely because the "discriminatory speech" amounts to an

act of discrimination, and it is the act of discrimination which is not
protected. Discriminatory speech or racist speech that does not amount

to an act of discrimination, however, is freedom of speech within the
meaning of the First Amendment, and any effort to sanction such a
speech is subject to analysis under the law of the First Amendment.
Thus, public universities can and should prohibit all acts of discrimination against minority students and other victim groups. The
universities can prohibit discrimination on the part of faculty members,
such as a faculty member's application of different grading standards
to minority or women students, or refusal to call on them in class, or
belittling of them when they do speak. 66 The universities can also prohibit discrimination by university-recognized student organizations,
167
such as racial or religious restrictions on fraternity membership.
165. Love, supra note 164, at 159.
166. As we have discussed previously, see supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text, a ban
on the use of racial epithets in the classroom, by either faculty members or students, can be
sustained as a reasonable time, place and manner limitation. As we stated there, it is difficult to
believe that even the most racist member would use racial epithets in the classroom today. However, it might be possible that a faculty member who is extremely hostile to persons of different
sexual orientation could use epithets such as "fag" or "dyke" in referring to such persons. The
deliberate use of such epithets by a faculty member would clearly amount to an act of discrimination against gay and lesbian students, and so would not be constitutionally protected. The nature
of the relationship between the faculty member and the student imposes certain constraints on the
faculty member, and the faculty member cannot use derogatory epithets with the intent to effect
disadvantageous treatment of gay and lesbian students.
It should also be noted that the interest in academic freedom protected by the First Amendment is essentially an interest related to freedom of inquiry and the unfettered expression of ideas.
A claim of academic freedom could not be relied on to justify discrimination against minority
students or women by refusing to call on them in class or by belittling them, nor could it be relied
on to justify the use of derogatory epithets. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that academic
freedom cannot be relied on even to shield confidential peer review materials from disclosure in a
discriminatory denial of tenure claim. University of Pa. v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n, 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
167. Such a prohibition would not interfere with any freedom of association rights of the
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They can prohibit recruiting on campus by employers that engage in

discrimination against victim groups, such as banning military recruitment because of the military's discrimination against gay and lesbian
persons.'6 8 The vigorous enforcement of a university's anti-discrimination policy conveys the university's strong commitment to educational
equality for all of its students.
When it comes to protecting individual students from harm at the
hands of other students, standard university regulations, of course, prohibit: physical attacks, theft, property destruction, and the like. The

universities can also prohibit one student from intentionally inflicting
emotional distress upon another student. This protective policy should

prohibit the intentional infliction of emotional distress for any reason,
not merely because of the student's membership in a victim group. A
student who is subject to the intentional infliction of emotional distress
by another student on the basis of personal dislike, for example, suffers
the same kind of emotional harm as a student who is subject to the
infliction of emotional distress because of that student's race, gender or
sexual orientation. However, the behavior that is the basis of the

charge of intentional infliction of emotional distress must be of substantially the same "outrageous" nature that would satisfy the require-

ments of a civil tort action, 169 and the charge cannot be based on actions that amount to the constitutionally protected expression of
ideas. 70 Likewise, the universities can prohibit sexual harassment, in
members of the fraternity, since the fraternity can go off-campus if it wants to continue its discriminatory practices. The university can legitimately insist that all recognized student organizations adhere to the university's non-discrimination policy, and its interest in providing equal opportunities for its minority students to participate in extra-curricular activates is surely "compelling"
for constitutional purposes. Cf. New York State Club Ass'n v. New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988)
(New York law prohibiting discrimination based on sex, race or religion by clubs involved in
commercial activity is not facially invalid and any possibility of overbreadth is curable through
case-by-case analysis).
168. In 1979 Wayne State University took this suggested action. The University of Pittsburgh School of Law took similar action in 1991, however, the prohibition there is limited to a
ban on interviewing at the law school facilities.
169. As to the common law tort of the intentional infliction of emotional distress, see the
discussion in Goldberger, supra note 142, at 1183-91, 1205-12.
170. In Doe v. University of Michigan, we pointed out that the adoption of the following
provision dealing with the intentional infliction of emotional distress would be constitutional:
No student shall engage in any action or series of actions directed toward another student
or group of students with the specific intention of inflicting emotional distress on such student or group of students or interfering with that student's academic efforts, employment,
participation in University sponsored extra-curricular activities or personal safety. The verbal or written expression of any idea in any form, unaccompanied by any action or series of
actions directed toward another student or group of students, as set forth above, shall not
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the sense of unwanted sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, unconsented to physical touching, and the making of "obscene telephone
calls"' 1' to another student. But it can not, under the law of the First
Amendment, define "sexual harassment" in such a way that would protect women students from being subjected to "sexual speech" not otherwise amounting to harassment.
Going beyond the protection of individual students from discrimination or from harmful acts by other students, the universities can best
promote equality of educational opportunity for all their students by
making a strong and demonstrable institutional commitment to educational diversity on the university campus. The major element of an institutional commitment to educational diversity is the achievement of a
truly diverse faculty and student body. This means that the universities
must rise above "tokenism" in faculty staffing, and see to it that in all
units throughout the university, minority and women faculty members
are represented in some reasonable proportion to their representation in
the different academic disciplines. Minority and women faculty can
serve as a resource for minority and women students, not merely as role
models, but as faculty members who can relate on a personal basis to
the problems that minority and women students may face on the university campus.172 Indeed, as regards educational diversity, the presence of a reasonable number of minority and women faculty can improve the quality of a university education for all students-in some
respects, most particularly for white males-since minority and women
faculty can bring to their teaching and research the perspective that
be violative of this section.
Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 9 n.9, Doe (No. 89CV-71683-DT).
As to the problems in applying the concept of intentional infliction of emotional distress to
verbal harassment alone, see Strossen, supra note 6, at 515-17. Professor Strossen concludes that,
"any cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress that arises from words must be
narrowly framed and strictly applied in order to satisfy first amendment dictates." Id. at 517.
171. Assuming that the definition of obscene phone call follows that contained in federal
and state laws prohibiting such behavior, and so does not reach protected expression. The typical
obscene phone call probably does not constitute freedom of speech within the First Amendment, in
that like the proverbial false cry of fire in a crowded theatre, it is devoid of communicative content
and so is not the expression of an idea. See supra note 162.
172. Since university faculties in most fields are predominantly male, it is likely that at least
some faculty members are gay, although not all gay faculty members may acknowledge their
sexual orientation. Those who do can serve as this kind of resource for gay students. Assuming
that the university does not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, an increase in the
number of women faculty should result in the addition of at least some lesbian faculty members
who can serve as this kind of resource for lesbian students.
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comes from the experience of being a minority person or a woman in
America. 7 ' Moreover, they can help their white male colleagues increase their own sensitivity to issues of racial equality, gender equality

and the like.
For minority students, the universities' commitment to educational
diversity necessarily means a commitment to affirmative action and the
increased enrollment of minority students. 17 4 Where a university has

succeeded in enrolling a "critical mass" of minority students, 17 5 minority students are less likely to feel isolated and will no longer be easy
targets for hostile white students. There is indeed safety in numbers,
and minority students can more effectively respond to racist attacks
from whatever source if they are in a position to act collectively. The
minority students will feel even more secure when the university has

also succeeded in having a reasonable number of minority faculty
members. When minority students feel that they belong at the university and that it is their university as well as the university of white
students, they are better able to react to and downplay the significance
of any racist speech or other racist incidents directed against them. 7 6
173. For a discussion of this "perspective" see Sedler, The Constitution, supra note 18, at
128-32.
174. See supra note 18 (discussing the necessity of using affirmative action to enroll a reasonable number of minority students).
175. My experience in litigating school desegregation cases on behalf of black parents and
children has convinced me of the crucial importance of critical mass. See, e.g., Newburg Area
Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ. of Jefferson County, Ky., 489 F.2d 925 (6th Cir. 1973), vacated
and remanded, 418 U.S. 918, appeal after remand, 510 F.2d 1398 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 931 (1975). In these cases we always insisted that under the desegregation plan, each
school have no less than 10% black students, so that the black students would not feel isolated,
and the white students would perceive the school as a racially integrated school rather than as a
virtually all-white school.
176. In the various presentations I have made on "racist speech on campus" since Doe v.
University of Michigan, such as at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government in October, 1989,
Smith College in March, 1990, and Dickinson Law School in April, 1990, I have compared the
situation at the University of Michigan with the situation at Wayne State University, where I
teach. The University of Michigan is an "elite" university, with a relatively small percentage of
black students, perhaps 5%, and relatively few black faculty members. The presence of these
black students is doubtless resented by some white students, who consider the black students to be
affirmative action students, admitted with lower "paper credentials" than their own and than
those of some of their friends who were not admitted. Because of their small numbers, the black
students are more likely to feel isolated and more sensitive to "racist speech" directed against
them by white students. Of course, if the University were to admit more black students and hire
more black faculty, it might lose some of its "elitism." See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT
SAVED 144 (1987) (where a hypothetical "elite" law school refuses to hire another black faculty
member, because it would make the faculty "too black," and the dean patronizingly says to the
black faculty member who recruited the candidate: "I don't want to be unkind. We do appreciate
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Finally, the universities can expand their curricula to promote the
values of equality and diversity, and to provide their students with in-

creased knowledge about racism, sexism, homophobia and the like in
American society and the world. The same First Amendment that pre-

cludes a public university from trying to enforce a "secular orthodoxy"
by means of campus bans on racist speech also protects "[t]he freedom
of a university to make its own judgments as to education,"' 177 and so
permits it to affirmatively promote the values of equality and diversity
in its educational program. The universities can and should offer a variety of courses that focus on issues of equality and that include the contributions made by minorities and women to the world in which we live.
The universities also can if they wish include some of these courses in
their general education requirements.
It is precisely because public universities have at their disposal all
these means of protecting the personal and educational welfare of their
your recruitment efforts, Geneva, but a law school of our caliber and tradition simply cannot look
like a professional basketball team."). It is far easier for an "elite" university to ban "racist
speech" on campus than to risk its "elitist" image by admitting more black students and hiring
more black faculty.
Wayne State University, where I teach, is certainly not an "elite" university. It is an urban
public university located in the inner city of Detroit. It has the largest black student enrollment,
over 20'%, of any traditional white university (this year's entering law school class, for example,
consisted of 42 black and hispanic students, or 18.7% of the total), and is considered by some in
the Detroit area to be the "black university." There is also a strong and visible commitment to
affirmative action; there are more black faculty than at most traditionally white universities, the
deans of liberal arts, social work, nursing and education are black, and blacks are represented in
the high reaches of the university administration. Because of the critical mass of black students
and the visible commitment of the university to affirmative action, black students at Wayne State
have a sense of security and a feeling of belonging. While incidents of "racist speech" doubtless
occur at Wayne State, as elsewhere, there has never been any suggestion that Wayne State should
adopt a ban on "racist speech." It would be completely unnecessary.
177. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (Powell, J.). Justice
Powell went on to quote Justice Frankfurter's summarization of the four essential freedoms that
constitute academic freedom in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring):
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to
speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail 'the four
essential freedoms' of a university-to determine for itself on academic grounds who may
teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.
438 U.S. at 312 (quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263).
In Bakke, Justice Powell relied on the First Amendment-based right of a public university to
select its own student body to find that precisely-tailored race-conscious admissions procedures
designed to achieve a racially-diverse student advanced a "compelling governmental interest" and
so were constitutionally permissible. See Robert A. Sedler, Racial Preference and the Constitution: The Societal Interest in the Equal ParticipationObjective, 26 WAYNE L. REv. 1227, 124448 (1980).
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students and of truly achieving equality of educational opportunity for
all of their students that they should completely turn away from trying
to impose unconstitutional bans on racist speech.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This article has demonstrated that virtually any campus ban on
racist speech imposed by a public university will be found unconstitutional. These campus bans on racist speech, whether of the very broad
type embodied in the University of Michigan's ban or whether of the
more narrow "targeted vilification" type advocated by academic commentators such as Professor Lawrence, and embodied in the University
of Wisconsin's ban, are directed against the expression of racist ideas
due to their purported harmful effect on racial minorities and other
victim groups. Because these bans are directed against the expression
of racist ideas, they are inconsistent with the First Amendment principles of content neutrality, the protection of offensive speech, and the
heightened protection to expression in the academic context. As Doe v.
University of Michigan and the UWM Post v. Board of Regents of the
University of Wisconsin System make clear, when these bans are challenged in court, they will be held to violate the First Amendment.
There are more positive and constitutionally permissible ways by
which a public university can try to achieve equality of educational opportunity for all of its students. While the academic debate over campus bans on racist speech will doubtless continue, it may be that public
universities will now decide to turn away from this unconstitutional enterprise and instead direct their efforts toward bringing about a meaningful equality of educational opportunity on campus.
ADDENDUM

While this article was in press and shortly before its publication,
the Supreme Court rendered its decision in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
Minnesota,' where the Court unanimously, although in two separate
and differing opinions, struck down a St. Paul ordinance banning the
display of a symbol which one knows or has reason to know arouses
anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion or gender.'7 9 Although serious time constraints prevent an ex178. 60 U.S.L.W. 4667 (U.S. June 22, 1992) (No. 90-7675).
179. ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990). The case arose out of a prosecution
against a group of teenagers who burned a crudely-made cross on the lawn of a black family that
had moved into a previously all-white neighborhood. Instead of prosecuting them only for a tres-
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tended analysis of the case and its ramifications, there can be no doubt
that the Court's holding makes authoritative the thesis of the present
article: "[t]hat under the law of the First Amendment, virtually any
campus ban on racist speech imposed by a public university will be
found to be unconstitutional."'u 0 Indeed, in view of the Court's holding,
it is now possible to eliminate the use of "virtually" as a qualification.
The Minnesota Supreme Court attempted to give the obviously
overbroad ordinance a narrowing construction by limiting it to "fighting words."'' The concurring opinion of Justice White, joined in this
respect by Justices Blackmun, Stevens and O'Connor, found that the
narrowing construction was insufficient to avoid the unconstitutional
overbreadth, because the narrowing construction defined "fighting
words" to include speech that causes anger, alarm or resentment based
on racial, ethnic, gender or religious bias.' 2 As Justice White stated,
"[t]he mere fact that expressive activity causes hurt feelings, offense,
or resentment does not render the expression unprotected,"' 8 and since
the ordinance, as purportedly narrowly construed, reached that kind of
expression, it was "fatally overbroad and invalid on its face."'8 4 The
rationale of Justice White's opinion makes it absolutely clear, as I have
contended, that the fighting words exception is extremely narrow and
cannot be expanded to include functional equivalents of fighting words
or to provide a psychic harm justification for campus bans on racist
85
speech.'
The Court majority, however, in an opinion written by Justice
Scalia, and joined in by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy, Souter and Thomas, went even further. Without considering the
effect of the Minnesota Supreme Court's purported narrowing construction of the ordinance, the majority held that the ordinance was
unconstitutional because it violated the principle of content neutrality.
pass on the property of the black family-which would not, of course, have raised any First
Amendment question-the city chose to prosecute them also under the ordinance, which would
apply even if they had burned the cross on their own lawn.
180. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
181. In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991).
182. R.A.V., 60 U.S.L.W. at 4677. In effect, the Minnesota Supreme Court was trying to

invoke the "words which by their very utterance inflict injury" part of Chaplinsky, just as the
University of Wisconsin did in the UWM Post case. As the district court found in that case and as
I have contended, that part of Chaplinsky has never been followed by the Supreme Court. See
supra notes 129-43 and accompanying text.
183. R.A.V., 60 U.S.L.W. at 4677.
184. Id.
185. See supra notes 124-55 and accompanying text.
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Over the strong disagreement of the concurring Justices, the majority
held that the principle of content neutrality applied to unprotected

speech, such as "fighting words." Since the ordinance, as interpreted,
prohibited only a particular category of fighting words-those dealing
with race, ethnicity, gender, and religion-while not restricting at all
other kinds of fighting words, it violated the principle of content neutrality. As Justice Scalia stated:
Displays containing abusive invective, no matter how vicious or severe, are permissible unless they are addressed to none of the specific disfavored topics. Those
who wish to use "fighting words" in connection with other ideas-to express hostility, for example, on the basis of political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality-are not covered. The First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to
impose special prohibition on those speakers who express views on disfavored
subjects.18 6

In this article I stated: "[A]s Doe v. University of Michigan and

the UWM Post case make clear, any campus ban on racist speech, no
matter how purportedly limited, that reaches the expression of racist
ideas violates the First Amendment. Under the principle of content

neutrality, a public university cannot ban the expression of racist ideas
186. R.A.V., 60 U.S.L.W. at 4671. The above discussion refers to a violation of the category aspect of the content neutrality principle. Justice Scalia also said that the ordinance violated
the viewpoint neutrality aspect of the principle, since it actually discriminated on the basis of
viewpoint, "fighting words" expressing a message of racial tolerance, for example, were not prohibited, while "fighting words" expressing a message of racial hatred were.
One could hold up a sign saying, for example, that all "anti-Catholic bigots" are misbegotten; but not that all "papists" are, for that would insult and provoke violence "on the basis
of religion." St. Paul has no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle,
while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensbury Rules.
Id.
The four concurring Justices strongly disagreed with the majority's position on this issue,
saying that the First Amendment permitted content distinctions with respect to unprotected
speech, and that, using an equal protection rational basis analysis, the city could conclude that the
prohibited kinds of "fighting words" were more harmful than other kinds of "fighting words." As
Justice White put it:
It is inconsistent to hold that the government may proscribe an entire category of speech
because the content of that speech is evil [citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 76364 (1982) (child pornography)]; but that the government may not treat a subset of that
category differently without violating the First Amendment; the content of the subset is by
definition worthless and undeserving of constitutional protection .... The ordinance proscribes a subset of "fighting words," those that injure "on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion or gender." This selective regulation reflects the City's judgment that harms based
on race, color, creed, religion, or gender are more pressing public concerns than the harms
caused by other fighting words. In light of our Nation's long and painful experience with
discrimination, this determination is plainly reasonable.
Id. at 4674-75.
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in any circumstance or for any purpose." 18 7 In R.A.V., the Supreme
Court majority applied the principle of content neutrality to invalidate
a ban on racist speech that was limited to unprotected "fighting
words." This being so, it is beyond contravention that the principle of
content neutrality protects the expression of racist ideas without qualification, and renders unconstitutional that "narrowest possible" campus
ban that would restrict such expression.
R.A.V. then sounds the death knell for campus bans on racist
speech. As a result of that decision, I am thus more optimistic that
"public universities will now decide to turn away from this unconstitutional enterprise and instead direct their efforts to bringing about a
meaningful equality of educational opportunity on campus. '"188
187.
188.

See supra note 144.
See supra note 180.

